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ABSTRAC T. We distinguish the economic problems when large financial institutions
("banks") become insolvent from the political challenges that exist before banks are distressed.
These political problems arise because policymakers would like to be able to precommit while a
bank is still healthy to refrain from bailing out the bank later, should it become distressed.
Political theory and historical experience show that politicians facing unsettled capital markets
and highly anxious voters will always bail out the financial institutions that they deem "Too Big
To Fail." As such, the only way for government credibly to commit to refrain from pursuing a
Too Big To Fail policy is to break up the largest financial institutions before they become Too
Big To Fail. We identify the size at which we believe banks become Too Big To Fail. Banks that
reach this size should be broken up. Liabilities should be limited to a metric based on the actual
funds devoted to resolving failed banks. The metric that we identify is the targeted value of the
FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund. We would prohibit any financial institution from amassing
liabilities in an amount greater than five percent of the targeted value of this fund. The
government could thereby commit credibly to stopping bailouts and to pursuing a policy of
allowing financial institutions to fail. We believe that the lost economies of scale associated with
this "ersatz-antitrust policy" would be offset by the large savings realized by avoiding future
bailouts.
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INTRODUCTION
Use of a precommitment device enables a government or other entity to
make a promise that it will be expected to keep in the future. A government
implements a precommitment device by taking some action (like tying oneself
to the mast or burning one's bridges) that eliminates its ability to take certain
other actions in the future. By eliminating certain options, a government can
increase the deterrence effect of a particular promise or threat by making the
promise or threat far more credible.'
In this Feature, we analyze massive government bailouts of financial
institutions as an example of a classic precommitment problem. In times of
economic stability, governments understand that future bailouts of massive
financial institutions will be expensive and inefficient; they will lead to
significant moral hazard on the part of the financial institutions that are eligible
for such bailouts. Policymakers, however, cannot credibly commit to refrain
from supporting large, important financial institutions.
The government's inability to precommit to refrain from engaging in
massive bailouts creates an implicit government guarantee: those institutions
in this "Too Big To Fail" category will be bailed out, despite the government's
inevitable prior pledges (usually made immediately after prior bailouts) to
refrain from orchestrating such bailouts in the future. These implicit
guarantees would be considered bad policy if articulated as explicit guarantees.
Some sort of precommitment device is needed to bring to an end the vicious
circle of bailouts in which the United States appears to be trapped. In our view,
the only precommitment device that enables the government to make a credible
promise to refrain from future massive bailouts is to act preemptively to
prevent financial institutions from growing so large that they become too big
to fail.
Our precommitment device takes the form of a bright-line rule that
operationalizes the adage-once popular among regulators but never
implemented-that "any financial institution that is too big to fail is too big to
survive." What this means, as a practical matter, seems obvious: we must
determine how big is Too Big To Fail and dismantle institutions larger than
that size. These institutions should be divided into smaller sizes such that they
1. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND
CONSTRAINTS 63-76, 92-95 (2000) (discussing strategies and rationales for precommitments
that restrict one's freedom to act in a subsequent time period); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE
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can be wound up without government intervention in a dissolution process if
they become insolvent.
Under this rule, no financial institution could amass aggregate liabilities in
an amount greater than 5% of the then-current targeted value of the FDIC
Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) for the current year.' We have selected the
targeted value of the DIF for several reasons. First, it is a standard that is
readily identifiable; the FDIC publishes this target in the Federal Register.'
Second, the standard is reasonably objective; the FDIC's target for the DIF is
expressed as a percentage of FDIC-insured deposits. Third, the standard is
flexible but reasonably protected from political influence; the FDIC is
empowered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to use its judgment to set the
target value of the DIF, taking into account any economic factors that it deems
appropriate. It must, however, select a target value of not less than 1.15% of
aggregate insured deposits but no greater than 1.5o% of aggregate insured
deposits.' This standard provides a practical protection against arbitrary easing
as well. If the target value is increased to allow bigger banks, then all banks will
have to pay higher assessments into the DIF. This has two consequences:
greater resources available for possible future resolutions and higher costs for
banks, the latter of which will temper those banks' fervor for growth.
This leads to our fourth reason for selecting this metric: it is linked to our
ability to absorb the failure of a financial institution without jeopardizing the
stability of the rest of the banking system. By way of illustration, the current
targeted value for the DIF is equal to 1.15% of total insured deposits, so the
bright-line limitation we propose would not allow any bank to have total
liabilities in excess of 0.0575% of total deposits, or approximately $3.o96
billion.'
2. Many insurance programs are organized such that disbursements to insured entities are
made from an insurance fund. Such insurance funds are often capitalized by premiums that
are adjusted to achieve certain targeted values or balances. As the fund grows larger,
premiums decline. Premiums can even reach zero or turn negative if the fund generates a
surplus. If the value of the fund declines due to investment losses or large payouts to insured
parties, then premiums go up until the fund is replenished. The United States, along with
several European countries, uses reserve targeting systems to determine the premiums paid
by the banks that participate in their government-sponsored deposit insurance programs.
See George G. Pennacchi, The Effects of Setting Deposit Insurance Premiums To Target
Insurance Fund Reserves, 17 J. FIN. SERVICEs RES. 153, 153 (2000).
3. 12 U.S.C. 5 181 7 (b)( 3 )(A)(i) (2006).
4. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 7 (b)( 3)(B), 12 U.S.C. 5 181 7(b)( 3)(B) (2006).
5. For the details of this calculation, see infra Section III.B. Prior to the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, the FDIC was required to set the targeted ratio in the range
between 1.15% and i.o%. If at any point the ratio was predicted to fall below 1.15%, the
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We understand, of course, that the government does not always achieve its
targets. For example, the current actual DIF reserve ratio is well below 1.15%
and is not projected to reach the targeted level until 2018.6 Under our proposed
rule, however, the actual DIF reserve ratio is irrelevant; our analysis focuses
solely on the targeted ratio, which, by statute, cannot fall below 1.15%. If our
approach were adopted, Congress would have a strong incentive never to lower
the minimum targeted ratio: if the ratio ever were reduced, then our rule
would result in an even larger number of banks being deemed "too big" than it
would under the current 1.15% target figure. And though Congress might have
an incentive to raise the minimum targeted ratio in response to political
pressure to allow large banks to retain their current size or to grow, any
increased risks of bailouts associated with such larger banks would be offset by
the larger deposit insurance premiums paid by all banks, since such premiums
are tied to the targeted, not the actual, reserve ratio.
Finally, by tying the metric to the target value of the DIF and not the actual
balance of the DIF, our bright-line rule does not compound a problem in times
of financial crisis (that is, an unintended negative feedback loop) and avoids
arguments over market accounting of DIF assets and questions of liquidity
versus capital in the fund.
The bright-line rule that we are proposing would require the largest
financial institutions to choose between downsizing themselves in order to
comply with the size rule or acquiescing to a government-mandated breakup
plan.' We estimate that only a small percentage of financial institutions would
be affected by our rule.
FDIC was required to develop a plan to ensure that the ratio increased to 1.15% within five
years. Between 2007 and 2009, the rate set by the FDIC was 1.25%, but the FDIC never
achieved this higher target. As of this writing, the targeted ratio is 1.15%. See OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT 1264 (201o), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/budget/fy2ol/assets/appendix.pdf. Section 334 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended
section 7(b)( 3)(B) of the FDIC Act to make the minimum designated ratio 1.35% of
estimated insured deposits. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 334, 124 Stat. 1376, 1539 (2010). Importantly for our purposes, the
Dodd-Frank Act requires that the FDIC publish for a period of not less than five years the
amount of estimated deposits that serves as the basis for calculating the DIF ratios. Id.
6. See OFFICE OF MGMT. &BUDGET, supra note 5.
7. While we do not here articulate a detailed statutory scheme for operationalizing our plan,
we note that the approach that we envision requires that there will be a clear statutory
deadline for breaking up financial institutions that have crossed the permissible size
threshold. In addition, the power to implement a breakup scheme would have to be
delegated to some administrative agency or combination of administrative agencies. We
recommend that the task be assigned to a group consisting of members of the Antitrust
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The bright-line rule is simple by design. It is simple to understand. It is
simple to administer and monitor. It is simple to enforce. It works
prospectively and does not require large groups of lawyers, accountants, or
financial engineers for implementation or compliance. It also does not rely on
the hope that the government will, in the future, permit large institutions to
fail, notwithstanding the fact that the government has never permitted such
institutions to fail in the past. Importantly, it provides for corrective action
before there is a crisis and not during or after a crisis, when political forces are
at their strongest.
We are limited in our choice of contingency plans for two reasons. First,
regulation, even massive regulation, has been tried and has failed. Elaborate ex
ante commitments to protect some creditors -including federally sponsored
deposit insurance, minimum capital requirements, activities restrictions, and
government inspections -have not enabled the government to make a credible
commitment to refrain from bailing out all the rest during a crisis.
Second, history is relevant. Because we have bailed out the banks in the
past, people have rationally come to expect that we will bail them out in the
future. Despite serious prior efforts to refrain from using taxpayer funds to bail
out companies like AIG, Citigroup, and Goldman Sachs, the political fallout
from the failures of these or other financial behemoths was deemed too great
for bailouts to be avoided in time of crisis. Put another way, our country's
established record of bailouts actually makes it far more difficult for the
government to make a remotely credible commitment to stop future bailouts.
Thus, because traditional regulation does not work and because people
have come to expect bailouts, the only solution to the Too Big To Fail problem
is to break up the largest financial institutions to a size that is sufficiently small.
This should be done so that (1) bankers, customers, and taxpayers do not
expect these institutions to be bailed out; (2) voters do not want their political
leaders to bail banks out, if and when they do become insolvent; and (3) banks
do not have sufficient political influence to "capture" regulators or government
leaders and perpetuate a false sense of economic importance. In this Feature,
we articulate the guidelines that we believe should be used to break up the
largest financial institutions in the economy.
Division of the Department of Justice and officials of the institution's primary regulator,
which generally will be either the Comptroller of the Currency (for national banks), the
Federal Reserve (for holding companies, hedge funds, private equity funds, insurance
companies, and state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System), the FDIC (for
state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve), or the Securities and
Exchange Commission (for broker-dealer firms).
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The rule that we propose would limit the economic risk of future financial
institution failures by severely limiting the size of banks and other financial
institutions that benefit not only from explicit FDIC insurance but also from
the broader set of implicit government guarantees.
In Part I of this Feature we discuss the current understandings of the
concept of Too Big To Fail. Specifically, we treat the twin problems that we
identify with "Big Banks." First, the government cannot credibly commit to
refrain from bailing them out when they get into financial distress, as they
inevitably do. Second, their size, and the certainty that they will be bailed out,
creates a "follow-the-leader" mentality that magnifies the costs and the
consequences of errors in judgment and analysis on the part of these
institutions' managers.
Part II of this Feature analyzes two facets of the current legal regime that
governs large financial institutions. First, we argue that the Too Big To Fail
doctrine, which is typically analyzed as a policy issue dealing with
"interconnectedness" (the term for the complex web of transactions and
dealings that appears to bind financial institutions together), is actually a
political issue. We posit that it is irrelevant whether bailouts are good public
policy or bad public policy: as long as bailouts are a political necessity for
elected officials and top bureaucrats, they will continue. Consequently, rather
than continue a meaningless debate about whether Too Big To Fail is good
public policy or bad public policy, we must accept the fact that bailouts are
inevitable as a practical matter as long as behemoth financial institutions exist.
In the second Section of Part II, we consider the role of antitrust policy in
our analysis. Ironically, antitrust law has not just tolerated big banks; U.S.
antitrust policy has actually created exceptions and loopholes for banks that
have exacerbated the problem of excessive size. These antitrust laws' exceptions
are misguided. The policy and practice of coddling and protecting the biggest
financial institutions should not just be ended; it should be reversed.
Regulators should move aggressively to dismantle banks that are too big to fail.
We recognize that our idea of breaking up the banks fits uneasily into the
current paradigm of antitrust law, which posits that the only legitimate
concern of antitrust law is fostering price competition in the markets for
capital, products, and services.8 As we point out below, however, the current
Too Big To Fail policy actually does convey an inappropriate and inefficient
competitive advantage to big banks; it provides them with artificially cheap
funding because, ceteris paribus, creditors inevitably prefer financial
8. Hence our use of the term "ersatz" in the title.
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institutions that enjoy implicit or explicit government guarantees rather than
risk their funds with smaller banks that might actually be allowed to fail.
Finally in Part III, we discuss what we call the "original" Volcker Rule,
which would have put strict curbs on bank size. Legislators considered this rule
when they were drafting the Dodd-Frank Act, but they ultimately discarded it.'
This is the main rival to our approach. Then, in the final Section of Part III, we
present our proposed rule, which we characterize as the "bright-line" rule. It is
the only simple, objective rule that has been proposed to deal with the Too Big
To Fail problem. A conclusion follows.
I. THE INTRACTABLE (POLITICAL) PROBLEM OF BIGNESS: HISTORY
AND CONTEXT
Bank bailouts may be bad policy, but politicians who face a choice between
reelection and good public policy will invariably choose reelection.o
Democracy creates an environment of "survival of the fittest" among
politicians. Those unwilling or unable to satisfy the voters will inevitably be
replaced. History may reward the statesman who takes unpopular views on the
important issues of the day, but politics does not. If an incumbent politician
fails to pursue the politically expedient path, then he or she will be replaced by
a politician who is willing to make the popular choices, irrespective of whether
that path is bad policy.
A. The Problems: Credible Commitments and Public Expectations
Bailouts of large, systemically important financial institutions are inevitable
not because economic policy requires them but because political survival does.
As long as large financial institutions exist, governments will continue to bail
them out. And elected officials and regulators, all of whom can be replaced
(either by voters or by politicians), cannot make a credible commitment to
refrain from bailing out large institutions. Those who will not orchestrate
9. See John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule, THE NEW YORKER, July 26, 2010, at 25, 25-26.
lo. Kenneth Rogoff presents a model that delves into the tendencies and incentives involved in
the structuring of budgets and spending by elected officials attempting to create an
advantageous political environment in the face of approaching elections. Kenneth Rogoff,
Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, 8o AM. ECON. REV. 21 (1990); see also Terry M. Moe, The
Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in ORGANIZATION
THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 116 (Oliver E. Williamson
ed., 1995) (presenting a model of interest-group influence on bureaucratic agencies and
elected officials).
1375
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
bailouts in times of crisis will inevitably be replaced by others who will. When
we focus on issues of interconnectedness, proprietary trading, uses of
derivatives, or subprime lending, we become distracted with the details of what
may have contributed to the problem and, importantly, miss what grabs the
attention of the political class that will craft the solution.
In 2008, world financial markets faced the worst financial crisis since the
Great Depression. Equity markets tumbled, debt markets froze, and banks
stopped lending. Brand-name financial firms like Merrill Lynch, Lehman
Brothers, Bear Stearns, Citibank, Bank of America, AIG, Fannie Mae, and
Freddie Mac - all once highly regarded - either failed or required extraordinary
assistance to stay afloat. Even the staunchest of free market advocates strongly
advocated government investment in financial institutions in order to avoid a
potential depression or, indeed, the complete collapse of the financial system.
Pundits and market participants alike thought that we were on the edge of the
abyss."
The Great Recession will also be remembered for making the phrase "Too
Big To Fail" part of everyday discourse and not just an obscure term used in
policy discussions among regulators, lawyers, and bankers. While concerns
about bank failures have long been a part of American financial history, the
idea that a particular bank would be saved because it was considered to be too
big to fail became a viable policy alternative in connection with the collapse of
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company (Continental Illinois)
in 1984." At the time of its failure, Continental Illinois was the seventh-largest
banking institution in the United States and represented the largest bank
failure in modern times by a wide margin." The resolution of Continental
Illinois presented problems for regulators due to the bank's size and
complexity. In resolving Continental Illinois, the FDIC departed from its
existing policy of paying uninsured depositors only a portion of their claim at
the time of the bank's closing, with the remainder paid only if net resolution
proceeds were available. Uninsured depositors were paid in full along with
ii. See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Edge of the Abyss, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A2 5. The column
quotes bond trader John Jansen as stating that current conditions are "the financial
equivalent of the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution" and Joel Prakken of
Macroeconomic Advisers saying that the economy seems to be on "the edge of the abyss."
Id. Krugman himself concludes that "the people who should be steering us away from that
abyss are out to lunch." Id.
12. See FDIC, Continental Illinois and "Too Big To Fail," in 1 AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING
CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990s, at 235 (1997), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235 258.pdf.
13. See id. ("[T]he crisis involving Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust ... was and
still is [as of 19971 the largest bank resolution in U.S. history.").
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insured depositors. The distinction between being insured and not being
insured became meaningless. This came to be referred to as Too Big To Fail in
likely reference to Continental Illinois's significant size and general prominence
compared to the other banks that were resolved under the FDIC's modified
payoff policy. There was genuine concern at the time that a run on Continental
Illinois could trigger a system-wide run with devastating consequences for all
financial markets and the U.S. economy in general.
"Too Big To Fail" was essentially shorthand for saying that in
extraordinary circumstances the normal rules would not apply and, in turn,
that depositors and creditors of banks that were big or important would be
paid more than would be the norm. In retrospect, it should have been apparent
that "extraordinary" times are the norm for when most banks fail and that Too
Big To Fail was the new normal. Not surprisingly, this policy was less than
popular with small banks and those who saw this as an expansion of the moral
hazard that already existed in bank insurance programs.
The Too Big To Fail policy continued in this indeterminate form until the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA)"
attempted to limit Too Big To Fail as a policy alternative in all but the clearest
of cases. Following a flood of savings-and-loan failures and the failure of a few
large banks (for example, Bank of New England and MCorp Bank) in the late
1980s and early 199os, the resolution process became a focal point for Congress
as insurance resources became strained. FDICIA was intended to strengthen
the Bank Insurance Fund" by providing the FDIC with access to the U.S.
Treasury and requiring it to pursue the "least cost" resolution of a failed
institution regardless of size." In other words, uninsured depositors and other
creditors were not to be treated like insured depositors.
14. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
15. Prior to enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA), the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) insured
deposits in savings and loans, while the FDIC insured deposits in banks. FIRREA
eliminated FSLIC and created two deposit insurance funds to be managed by the FDIC. One
fund, the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF), insured deposits in savings-and-loan
associations. The other fund, the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), insured deposits in banks.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 9
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 5§ 1811-21), merged the SAIF and the BIF into the current
Deposit Insurance Fund.
16. As the name implies, the "least cost" method of resolution requires that the FDIC take into
account all costs and benefits associated with all alternative methods of resolving a failed
institution and select the method that represents the smallest net present value cost to the
insurance fund. An excellent description of the process and the factors that the FDIC
normally considers can be found in FDIC, Overview of the Resolution Process, in MANAGING
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Ironically, this statute was supposed to make certain that the Too Big To
Fail policy was no longer an alternative open to regulators-or so it was
generally thought. FDICIA provided that the FDIC did not have to use the
"least cost" resolution if the FDIC (by two-thirds majority vote of its board),
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (by two-thirds majority vote),
and the Secretary of the Treasury (after consultation with the President)
determined that the failure of a particular bank would present "systematic
risk."" Until the Great Recession, it was generally considered that this
exception would never be used. Not only has it now been used, but also the law
has been twisted so as to permit government bailouts of uninsured financial
institutions - such as investment banks and insurance companies.
Consider the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Much of the discourse
surrounding that event involved speculation as to whether it was "right to say
that the BP oil spill is something like Obama's Katrina."' 8 Hurricane Katrina
was considered a defining moment in the presidency of George W. Bush, and
the federal response was pointed to as "a symbol of then-President George W.
Bush's inattention to the hard work of managing the nation's domestic
business."" The seemingly uncontrollable flow of oil from BP's well, which
became the largest spill in U.S. history, also turned into "a public test of
[President Barack Obama's] competence at handling an unanticipated crisis."o2
For a time at least,
Obama's authority and credibility were leaking away with the gulf's
deep water oil.
As with Katrina, the White House responded to an unexpected
problem with hesitation and missteps. Obama's aides were slow to
assert federal responsibility; they initially described the problem as BP's
THE CRisis: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 1980-1994, at 55 (1999), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/historyl-02.pdf.
17. Robert A. Eisenbeis & Larry D. Wall, Reforming Deposit Insurance and FDICIA, FED. RES.
BANK ATLANTA ECoN. REv., First Quarter 2002, at 1, 13 n.5, available at
http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wall-eisenbeis.pdf ("The 'systemic risk' part of
least cost resolution provides that the FDIC need not follow least cost resolution if doing so
would have very adverse consequences for the system as a whole. However, for the systemic
risk clause to be invoked, approval is required by not only two-thirds of the FDIC Board but
also by two-thirds of the Federal Reserve Board and by the Secretary of the Treasury. These
changes are intended to make it more difficult for the deposit insurer to extend coverage to
uninsured depositors and other creditors.").
18. Yuval Levin, 'Obama's Katrina,' NAT'L REv. ONLINE: THE CORNER (May 27, 2010, 1:22 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/199914/obamas-katrina/yuval-levin.
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to solve, not theirs. After that wore thin, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar
abruptly suggested that the federal government might seize control of
the well -only to be publicly contradicted by his crisis manager, Coast
Guard Adm. Thad Allen, who said such a move would be foolish."
Tellingly, in the midst of the crisis, President Obama claimed that history
would absolve him of blame for the oil spill. At a news conference in late May
2010, Obama predicted that "[w]hen the problem is solved ... I'm confident
that people are going to look back and say that this administration was on top
of what was an unprecedented crisis." 2 Ratcheting up the political rhetoric,
political commentator George Will said that the oil spill was like the Iranian
hostage crisis that ruined President Jimmy Carter's chances of winning a
second term as President.
While a general consideration of when and how the government becomes
liable for crises is outside the scope of this Feature, some preliminary insights
can be distilled, even at this early stage of research on the topic. There is a clear
consensus that government is ultimately responsible for resolving certain
problems, notwithstanding the fact that the government was not responsible
for, and may have had nothing to do with, the problems that created the crisis.
Under certain conditions, there exist implicit (as well as explicit) government
guarantees to solve certain social problems, notwithstanding that public policy
might indicate that the best way to address the problem would be to leave the
government out. 4
Moreover, while we have yet to develop a theory of what causes an issue to
move from the sphere of private responsibility into the sphere of public
responsibility, some observations can be made. Intriguingly, for example, the
issue is not purely ideological, as one might at first expect. In other words, one
would think that "liberals" and others who advocate active government
involvement in the economic sphere would favor government responsibility,
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. On May 30, 2oo, Will told Jake Tapper of ABC that "I think the danger isn't that this is his
Katrina. It's that it's his Iranian hostage crisis." This Week (ABC television broadcast May
30, 2010), available at http://rawstory.con/rs/2010/0530/oil-spill-obamas-iran-hostage
-crisis.
24. Despite BP's responsibility for the major oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, polls demonstrate
that there exists a consensus among the American public that the government should play a
more active role in curtailing any further damage that the spill may cause. See Jon Cohen,
Poll Shows Negative Ratings for BP, Federal Government, WASH. POST: BEHIND THE NUMBERS
(June 7, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind-the-numbers/
2010/0 6/pollshows-negative-ratings fo.html.
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while "conservatives," who favor a laissez-faire approach toward the economy,
would argue that the government should decline to take responsibility for
problems that are outside of the government's sphere of expertise or interest.
But this does not appear to be the case. For example, Louisiana's Republican
governor, Bobby Jindal, has made it clear that he thinks that the federal
government has a large role to play in dealing with the BP oil spill off of the
Louisiana coastline." Interestingly, when asked how he could reconcile his
belief in limited government with his demands for more federal assistance and
support of the BP disaster, Jindal observed that "[w]hen government grows
too big, it doesn't do its core functions properly. . . . Absolutely, I believe in a
limited government that is effective and competent in what it does. We need
... our federal government exactly for this kind of crisis."
Of course, the public expects the government to solve crises-like the
Iranian hostage crisis - that involve issues that are clearly within the
government's purview, such as national defense and foreign policy. We believe,
however, that the government can also expand or contract the issues for which
it is held responsible. The recent debate over health care, for example, can be
viewed as a debate about whether the government or the private sector is
responsible for providing health care. Still more recently, the creation of a new
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, as part of the financial reform
package, likely will alter expectations about the federal government's
responsibility for protecting consumers involved in commercial transactions.
Since the passage of the Depression-era financial regulations," banking and
investment banking have been among the most heavily regulated industries in
the United States. The existence of deposit insurance and the responsibility
that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has assumed for the
stability of the financial system, as well as the SEC's responsibility for the
stability of the securities markets, are also likely accountable for the assumption
that the government is responsible not only for managing financial crises but
also for preventing financial crises from occurring in the first place.
Thus, generally speaking, as the government has grown, so too have public
expectations about its responsibilities for systemic mishaps. Those expectations
exist regardless of whether such mishaps occur naturally and regardless of
25. See Jake Tapper, Louisiana Gov. Jindal to Obama: Give Us More Power on Oil Spill, ABC NEWS
POL. PUNCH (May 30, 2010, 8:56 AM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/
05/louisiana-gov-jindal-to-obama-give-us-more-power-on-oil-spill.html.
26. Id.
27. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 55 77a-77m (2006));
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78nn); Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (repealed 1999).
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whether solving them is something at which the government has any
competence, much less expertise or experience.
As such, this Feature is written under the premise that, regardless of the
provenance for the assumption, the ineluctable reality is that when financial
crises occur, the government (at least in the United States) naturally and
inevitably assumes responsibility for resolving the immediate crisis and for
"making sure" that such a crisis will not happen again. Government officials
recognize this. They no longer purport that regulation can prevent future
financial crises, but they do promise to refrain from future bailouts. President
Barack Obama defended financial reform by saying, "I am absolutely confident
that the bill that emerges is going to be a bill that prevents bailouts. That's the
goal.""' Senator Christopher Dodd made the same point, emphasizing that his
proposed statute "ends bailouts. Nothing could be more clear."" In fact, the
only thing that could not be "more clear" is that politicians have tried for
decades without success to solve the Too Big To Fail problem by instructing
regulators to refrain from bailouts.3 o
This phenomenon is not unique to the United States. There have been
large or systemic banking failures in a large and diverse group of industrialized
democracies, including (but not limited to) Austria," Denmark," Sweden,"
Ireland," the United Kingdom," Russia, " Germany, 7 Indonesia,"' Japan,"
28. David M. Herszenhorn & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House and Democrats Join To Press Case
on Financial Controls, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, at Bi.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. 31,657 (1991) (statement of Rep. Mary Rose Oakar) ("H.R. 2094
eliminates the too-big-to-fa[i]l doctrine . . . . No longer will regulators be able to prevent
large banks from failing because they view these large institutions as too important to the
financial industry or the country. Too often, managers at these large banks have abused this
policy and taken risks that were totally unjustified, secure in the knowledge that if their big
gamble failed, the Government and taxpayers would bail them out."); id. at 5182 (statement
of Sen. Donald Riegle) ("This legislation is specifically designed to stop the current practice
of bailing-out uninsured depositors in the big banks, based on the existing theory that such
banks are considered too big to fail. That practice must end and this legislation will end
it.").






35. See Kathryn Hopkins & Jill Treanor, King Reveals Secret HBOS and RBS Bailout, GUARDIAN
(London), Nov. 25, 2009, at 28.
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Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and France.4o In every one of these
countries, bank failures inevitably have led to bailouts. Why? Because these
countries are democracies, and in democracies politicians who decline to
pursue a dramatic response to crises are unlikely to survive.41 It is for this
reason that Too Big To Fail is so often an attractive policy alternative.
In our view, then, the Dodd-Frank Act, like other schemes to deal with the
Too Big To Fail problem, is likely to be ineffective because it treats the public
policy problem associated with banks' failure as a technical problem in banking
regulation when it should be treated as a political problem. Our plan to break
up the banks addresses this political problem in three ways. First, because
smaller banks exert less political pressure than behemoth banks, politicians are
less likely to be captured by smaller banks than by large financial institutions.
To be sure, community banks have better access and more influence with
36. See Dmitry Zhdannikov & Dmitry Sergeyev, Russia Bank Bailout Hits $5.5 Bln; Queue Grows,
REUTERS (Oct. 17, 20o8, 1:13 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSLH61o6o820o81o17-
37. See Andrea Thomas, German Bank Bailout To Cost EUR34 Billion to EURS2 Billion - INSM
Study, Fox Bus. (July 29, 2010), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2olo/o7/29/german
-bank-bailout-cost-eur-billion-eur-billion-insm-study.
38. See Carolina Rumuat, Indonesia: Bank Bailout Sparks Political Crisis, GLOBAL VOICES (Mar. 8,
2010), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2010/o3/o8/indonesia-bank-bailout-sparks-political
-crisis.
39. See Mariassunta Giannetti & Andrei Simonov, On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro-
Evidence from Japan (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 103.2009, 2009),
available at http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/200 9 111 9 125 02 9 4 1o3-o9.pdf.
40. See 0. EMRE ERGUNGOR & JAMES B. THOMSON, SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES 1-2 (2005),
available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/POLICYDIS/No9Janos.pdf (providing
information about the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States);
BENTON E. GUP, BANK FAILURES IN THE MAJOR TRADING COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 17-28,
30-44 (1998) (providing information about Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands,
Italy, and Japan); Jonathan R. Macey, Commercial Banking and Democracy: The Illusive Quest
for Deregulation, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (20o6).
41. Simon Johnson and James Kwak offer an excellent analysis of economic crises in emerging
market countries as a framework for evaluating the handling of the U.S. financial crisis
before concluding that
[u] sually the biggest of the big -the top chaebol, Suharto's close business allies
. . . and the large Russian natural resource companies (such as Gazprom) -
survive and prosper thanks to generous bailouts and other forms of government
support. It's their smaller competitors who are cut adrift, while ordinary people
suffer through government "austerity measures."
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 50 (2010).
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members of the House of Representatives, but large national banks dominate
in the Senate and with national political parties.
Second, because politicians and regulators have an established track record
of bailing out big banks and allowing smaller institutions to fail, people do not
expect that smaller institutions will be bailed out when they find themselves in
financial distress. In contrast, based on past experience, the public expects that
large financial institutions will be bailed out, just as surely as the police and
rescue teams come to the aid of reckless motorists who hit a wall. In other
words, over time, bailouts become a self-fulfilling prophecy: bailouts inevitably
occur because people expect them to occur. And because people expect them to
occur, they plan as if they will occur. These expectations, and the concomitant
lack of planning by bank managers, make it practically impossible for
politicians to decline to respond to crises with bailouts.
Third and most importantly, the largest financial institutions should be
broken up because they tend to make bad bets and to follow each other to
doom by consistently making the same bad bets. In other words, the big banks
act like lemmings. As former Citigroup CEO Charles Prince admitted in a
famous interview with the Financial Times, "When the music stops, in terms of
liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you've
got to get up and dance. We're still dancing."" It is hard to imagine the CEO
of any large bank advocating a strategy of becoming smaller, serving fewer
clients, and not boldly moving forward, particularly when size of bank and size
of CEO paycheck are strongly correlated.
B. The Lemmings Problem
In economic terms, the big banks are caught in an "information cascade."
An information cascade occurs when a market participant can easily observe
the behavior of those around him and follows the behavior of the other market
participants without regard to his or her own information, beliefs, or views of
42. Because community banks are distributed more broadly around the country from a
geographical point of view, many more members of Congress have community banks in
their districts than have large national banks in their districts. Thus, we believe that
community banks likely will have relatively more influence in Congress. Community
bankers exercise their political influence through state-level organizations. See, e.g., CMTY.
BANKERS Ass'N OF ALA., http://www.mycbaa.com/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2o1o). The largest
banks tend to be represented by their own lobbyists.
43. Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-outs, FT.coM
(July 9, 2007, lo:o8 PM BST), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/o/8oe2987a-2e5O-ildc-821c
-0000779fd2ac.html.
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the market." Breaking up the banks in the way that we suggest in Part III will
reduce the proclivity of banks to play "follow the leader" in conforming to the
moves of the dominant firms in the industry.
Information cascades occur because, under certain conditions, "individuals
rapidly converge on one action on the basis of some but very little
information."4 5 In its current form, the financial services industry has a few
very dominant firms such as AIG in insurance; Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley in traditional investment banking; and Bank of America, Citigroup,
and JPMorgan Chase in traditional commercial banking. These firms are
closely linked, and their actions are highly visible to one another. This market
structure leads to copycat behavior.
If the market were broken up in the way that we suggest, such behavior
would still be possible, but it would be far less likely for several reasons. First,
increasing the number of participants would make copycat behavior more
costly because it is more difficult and time-consuming to observe the behavior
of numerous actors than to observe the behavior of a small number of large
financial institutions. Second, the process of breaking up the banks that we
propose would, by definition, result in the largest, most copied institutions
being broken up. Consequently, after this breakup occurred, the institutions on
which people tend to focus would no longer exist in their current form. There
would be several versions of each one, and thus there would be no obvious
leader for the other market participants to follow.
In addition, because it often is the case that "the same objective information
may be capable of sustaining different, even highly different belief patterns,"46
increasing the number of market participants would increase the chances of
multiple responses to any particular instance of observed behavior. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, increasing the size of the market would reduce the
returns to lemming behavior because the very act of increasing the number of
competitors in the financial markets would lower the probability of- and
therefore the expected returns associated with-following the industry leader.
As noted above, when a large financial institution fails, people expect a
government response. This expectation is the sort of event that creates an
information cascade: because everybody rationally expects a government
bailout of certain firms, it becomes rational to bail out those firms. Breaking up
44. See Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, A Theory ofFads, Fashion, Custom,
and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, too J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); Timur Kuran &
Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999).
45. Bikhchandani et al., supra note 44, at 994.
46. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Controlling Availability Cascades, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 374, 381 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
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the banks can stop the current herd behavior, because such a breakup would
send a strong signal that the previously observed herd behavior is no longer
rational. As Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch observe, "Cascades can be
sensitive to public information releases."" Those information releases,
however, must be credible. Empty rhetoric about "ending bailouts" is no
substitute for a credible signal such as actually breaking up the banks.
Moreover, if the largest banks are broken up, then cascade behavior will be
far less likely because there will be no "leader of the pack" to follow. The
cascade literature assumes that there is a leader, or at least a "first mover," who
may or may not have qualities that one normally associates with leadership.48
Simply put, if the big banks are broken up, there no longer will be first movers
for the rest of the industry to follow. This, in and of itself, will make the
banking system more resilient; the diminution in the current lemming-like
behavior and increase in diversity of decisionmaking will translate into a
diversification of strategies within the banking industry. This will lead to a
significant reduction in systemic risk.
Thus, as long as we have big banks, we will have implicit insurance of large
financial institutions and the culture of bailouts that such an insurance scheme
brings with it. Our approach is to address the root cause of the problem, which
is that the size of the largest institutions makes bailouts inevitable.
II. THE SHORTCOMING OF CURRENT LAW
While the "systemic risk" exception to the "least cost" resolution directive
of FDICIA was intended to limit severely Too Big To Fail as an alternative, it
has ironically opened the loophole even further and produced even more
uncertainty among financial institutions and investors. "A risk to the system"
is, by definition, whatever the FDIC Board of Directors, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, and the Secretary of the Treasury say it is.
During the throes of the Great Recession, the bailout of the brokerage house
Bear Stearns was justified (in part) because it was determined that Bear Stearns
was too interconnected within the financial system to be allowed to fail.
47. Bikhchandani et al., supra note 44, at 1004.
48. "An information cascade is a situation in which an individual makes a decision based on
observation of others without regard to his own private information." Sushil Bikhchandani,
David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, Information Cascades, in 4 THE NEw PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS 329, 329 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
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A. Interconnectivity and the Uncertainty of Too Big To Fail
Bear Stearns was the fifth-largest brokerage house in the United States
before it was acquired in an assisted transaction by JPMorgan Chase, itself a
very large bank. But as we would learn from the failure of the fourth-largest
investment bank in the United States, Lehman Brothers, size alone does not
translate into systemic risk. Bear Stearns was a leading underwriter of
mortgage securities, but Lehman Brothers was bigger. Bear Stearns was a large
underwriter of equity securities and dealer of commercial paper, but, again,
Lehman Brothers was bigger on both counts. Bear Stearns was reportedly a big
participant in the credit default swap market, but so was Lehman Brothers, and
because this is a private and highly opaque market we have no way of knowing
who was in fact bigger in this field. And while at the time of its failure Bear
Stearns was not a bank or a bank holding company, within six months the only
two large investment banks remaining in the United States would be. All of
this makes the question of what constitutes "too interconnected" in the context
of a securities business relevant. As former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson
wrote in his account of the Great Recession, On the Brink,
They [critics of the decision to provide assistance] thought we should
have let Bear fail. . . . To be fair, I could see my critics' arguments. In
principle, I was no more inclined than they were to put taxpayer money
at risk to rescue a bank that had gotten itself in a jam. But my market
experience had led me to conclude - and rightly so, I continue to
believe -that the risks to the system were too great.49
In September 2008, insurance giant AIG was determined to be too
important to fail. In the words of then-Secretary Henry Paulson, "If any
company defined systemic risk, it was AIG, with its $i trillion balance sheet
and massive derivatives business connecting it to hundreds of financial
institutions, governments, and companies around the world.""o
Just a few weeks later, in working to find a way to inject capital into several
large banks, then-Secretary Paulson offered his own interpretation of how
systemic risk should be determined. In his view, systemic risk existed if "an
institution's failure would seriously hurt the economy or financial stability."5'
49. HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE To STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 117 (2010).
5o. Id. at 204-05.
51. Id. at 340.
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We highlight these differing interpretations of systemic risk, not to be
critical of former Secretary Paulson or his actions, but rather to illustrate just
how nebulous the concept of Too Big To Fail has become. Even to someone as
financially experienced and sophisticated as Henry Paulson, a former Goldman
Sachs CEO, systemic risk can mean, variously: too interconnected, too
important, causing serious hurt to the economy, or causing financial
instability. These are not insignificant differences, particularly when hundreds
of billions of dollars are at stake.
In October 2008, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the FDIC Board
of Directors, and the Secretary of the Treasury determined that several of the
largest financial institutions in the United States were systemically critical to
the economy and should not be allowed to fail. These banks were at the time:
Bank of America Corp., Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Citigroup, Inc.,
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JP Morgan Chase & Co., Merrill Lynch & Co.
(which was soon merged into Bank of America Corp.), Morgan Stanley, State
Street Corp., and Wells Fargo & Co. 2 Just four of these institutions-
Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo -held 39% of
all of the deposits in FDIC-insured financial institutions.s" Seventy-seven
percent of the $13.3 trillion in assets owned by the 8204 FDIC-insured banks
are owned by the largest 116 banks, which means that 77% of banking assets
are held by 1.4% of banks."
To ensure their future security, the Treasury invested an aggregate of $205
billion in capital in these banks and other financial institutions through the
Capital Purchase Program."
One of the most dramatic moves during the crisis was the Treasury's
decision to bail out all investors' losses in money-market mutual funds. A
money-market mutual fund is a type of mutual fund that must, by law, invest
52. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o9-16i, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM:
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED To BETTER ENSURE INTEGRITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
TRANSPARENCY 18 tbl.1 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dog161.pdf.
s3. Rolfe Winkler, Break Up the Big Banks, REUTERS: OPTION ARMAGEDDON (Sept. 15, 2009,
1:07 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/rolfe-winkler/2oog/o9/15/break-up-the-big-banks.
54. FDIC Insuring 8,2oo Banks with $9 Trillion in Deposits and Zero in the Deposit Insurance Fund,
MY BUDGET 360, http://www.mybudget36o.com/fdic-insuring-8200-banks-with-9-trillion
-in-deposits-and-zero-in-the-deposit-insurance-fund-calling-banks-to-prepay-assessment
-of-45-billion (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
ss. See Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/capitalpurchaseprogram.html (last
updated Oct. 3, 2010).
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in highly liquid, low-risk securities.s 6 The fundamental economic principle
underlying money-market mutual funds is that such funds are substitutes for,
and compete with, the traditional transaction (checking) accounts offered by
banks. The trade-off is that money-market mutual funds offer slightly higher
rates of return but, because they are not insured by the federal government,
also pose somewhat greater risks than bank deposits do.
Without even attempting to explain the tortured logic that would allow the
use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund (established by the Gold Reserve Act of
1934 in order to stabilize currency markets) to be used to backstop money-
market mutual funds, on September 29, 2008, then-Secretary Paulson
announced that the share prices of all such funds would be protected." Money-
market mutual fund assets were valued at approximately $3.45 trillion on the
date of this announcement.s
Bailing out money-market mutual funds was perverse public policy because
it gave the relatively affluent money-market mutual fund investors a "free
lunch" in the form of government insurance of their assets that they did not
pay for-or even reasonably anticipate. Unlike money-market mutual funds,
banks are required to pay insurance premiums to the FDIC for insuring their
deposit accounts. Money-market mutual funds-and their investors -received
the benefits of such insurance without having to pay for it.
So it is that in twenty-five years Too Big To Fail was transformed from a
somewhat vague notion that, in certain cases, uninsured depositors and
creditors of very large banks might be treated like insured depositors into a
multifaceted rationale for investing in banks engaged in a wide range of
financial services businesses. In its original formulation, Too Big To Fail
protected debtholders. In its latest version, Too Big To Fail protects all
56. Mutual funds, also known as investment companies, exist to invest money on behalf of their
shareholders. Mutual funds raise money to invest by selling their shares to investors.
Mutual funds then invest this money in stocks, bonds, and other assets. The combined
holdings of stocks, bonds, or other assets the fund owns constitute the mutual fund's
portfolio. The shares purchased by investors represent claims on a pro rata portion of the
assets in the mutual fund's portfolio. Certain mutual funds, known as open-end mutual
funds, stand ready to purchase ("redeem") their investor's shares at their average price. See
Money Market Funds, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/mfmmkt.htm (last updated Sept. 23, 2009).
57. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee
Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/hpu61.htm.
58. See INv. Co. INST., Weekly Total Net Assets and Number of Money Market Mutual Funds,
http://www.ici.org/pdf/mm data_2olo.pdf (indicating $3.46 trillion in money market
assets as of September 24, 20o8).
1388
120:13 68 2011
FAILURE IS AN OPTION
stakeholders, including common shareholders and employees with incentive
plans. It protects banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and money-
market mutual funds. This expansion of the policy occurred despite the efforts
of Congress to make the use of even the more limited, depositor-focused Too
Big To Fail policy extremely difficult."
On July 15, 2010-after several months of negotiating, drafting,
compromising, lobbying, and political dealmaking-the House of
Representatives and the Senate passed a bill nominally intended to reform
financial services and prevent the next crisis .' Generally referred to as the
Dodd-Frank Act, it addresses Too Big To Fail through a combination of
studies, the expansion of discretionary regulatory powers, and a limitation on
the ability of banks to engage or invest in proprietary trading and other
alternative asset investments. The Act was signed into law by President Obama
on July 21, 2010. Accompanying the announcement of the passage of the
roughly 2300-page legislation, the House Committee on Financial Services
released a summary of the key provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act entitled Brief
Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:
Create a Sound Economic Foundation To Grow Jobs, Protect Consumers, Rein in
Wall Street and Big Bonuses, End Bailouts and Too Big To Fail, Prevent Another
Financial Crisis .6 To be sure, this was an act born of high expectations.
In fact, there is reason to believe that the Dodd-Frank Act actually will
increase the probability that financial institutions in general, and insurance
companies in particular, will be bailed out in the future.2 While the Act gives
regulators new resolution authority over large financial firms and encourages
regulators to take prompt corrective action against insolvent firms, regulators
have received similar powers before and opted to continue bailouts rather than
impose resolution strategies that shut down insolvent firms. Dodd-Frank does
not address the fundamental issue of providing a clear end to Too Big To Fail
as a policy option.
59. See supra notes 14-16, 30 and accompanying text.
6o. H.R. 4173, 11ith Cong. (2010) (enacted).
61. HousE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF DODD-FRANK], available
at http://banking.senate.gov/public/ files/o7olloDoddFrank WallStreetReform
comprehensive summary Final.pdf.
62. See Joe Nocera, Dubious Way To Prevent Fiscal Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 20o, at Bi; Peter J.
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What the Dodd-Frank Act does instead is increase regulators' discretion
and power.63 The notion that this discretion and power will necessarily be used
to avoid bailouts of big financial firms is unrealistic from a political point of
view. The Act also requires banks, investment banks, and insurance companies
viewed as posing a systemic risk to submit periodic "funeral plans" laying out
how they could be wound up in an orderly way if they become insolvent. The
idea here is that agencies will not have to bail out insolvent institutions because
they can just follow the funeral plans. Of course, there is no requirement that
regulators must follow these plans. And there is no reason to believe that they
will.
The Act also creates a new bureaucracy, or "council of regulators," with the
authority to identify and resolve problems of systemic risk. Financial
institutions like insurance companies, hedge funds, and venture capitalists that
now operate to some extent without interference from federal regulations could
then be brought into the regulatory fold. But the bureaucrats running this new
council could face peculiar incentives. Nobody will ever know if they have
intervened too much or too early-and if in doing so they destroyed assets that
were legitimate.
But if, hypothetically, a financial bubble were ever allowed to burst, the
bureaucrats in the council of regulators would face intense criticism for having
failed in their basic mission. Thus, this council will consistently err on the side
of overintervention. When regulators fear an institution is about to become
insolvent or is operating while insolvent, they will bail it out to prevent the
systemic risk ogre from running amok through the economy. This is precisely
what happened during the Great Recession-first for Bear Stearns and AIG,
then for the hundreds of financial institutions that collected TARP money, and
then for the thousands of banks and mutual funds that got the benefit of a
vastly expanded federal safety net.
There is, undeniably, a great demand for regulation of financial
institutions.6 4 What is less well understood is that the massive regulation of
financial institutions generates expectations. Specifically, the existence of a
massive regulatory scheme creates the expectation on the part of voters that the
government will confront and remediate the failure of all financial institutions,
and not just commercial banks.
63. See Wallison, supra note 62.
64. See, e.g., Karlyn Bowman, Americans Wary of Wall Street, Washington, FORBES.COM (May 21,
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B. Antitrust: Change in Focus Needed
The overwhelming trend in the financial services industry over the past
thirty years has been toward consolidation. There were 10,787 banking mergers
in the United States between 1980 and 2009, and, during this time, no
regulator challenged a prospective merger involving an institution with more
than $i million in assets on antitrust grounds.6 5 Today, the five largest banks
in the United States hold an astonishing forty-two percent of all deposits, up
from twelve percent in 1980.66 This is remarkable on its own, but it is even
more incredible when one factors in the amazing growth of commercial
banking and financial services generally during this period.67 In fact, to date,
no federal banking agency or the Department of Justice has ever
considered the competitive effect of a merger on the stability of the
financial system. Despite the fact that competition policy in banking
has struggled to balance antitrust law and stability concerns since the
development of federal statutory antitrust law in the late nineteenth
century, as applied to banking, antitrust law . . . has never
accommodated stability concerns
such as the ones discussed in this Feature.
As noted in the Introduction, our point is not that the recent consolidation
of the financial services sector permits collusion or price-fixing among financial
institutions-although we do observe significant evidence of such illegal
activities in some parts of the sector, particularly in the credit card industry6 9
65. David M. Kaden, The Next Philadelphia National Bank: Reclaiming Antitrust Law for Bank
Competition Policy i (May 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
66. Id.
67. See JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 41, at 59 ("In addition, the financial sector itself simply got
bigger and bigger. When John Gutfreund became CEO of Salomon in 1978, all commercial
banks together held $1.2 trillion of assets, equivalent to 53 percent of the U.S. GDP. By the
end of 2007, the commercial banking sector had grown to $11.8 trillion in assets, or 84
percent of U.S. GDP. But that was only a small part of the story. Securities broker-dealers
(investment banks), including Salomon, grew from $33 billion in assets, or 1.4 percent of
GDP, to $3.1 trillion in assets, or 22 percent of GDP. Asset-backed securities such as
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which hardly existed in 1978, accounted for another
$4.5 trillion in assets in 2007, or 32 percent of GDP. All told, the debt held by the financial
sector grew from $2.9 trillion, or 125 percent of GDP, in 1978 to over $36 trillion, or 259
percent of GDP, in 2007." (footnote omitted)).
68. Kaden, supra note 65, at 2.
69. Anticompetitive conduct in the credit card industry manifests itself in a variety of ways. In
particular, interchange fees and strict exclusivity rules have run afoul of the antitrust laws.
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and in the brokerage industry.7 o Rather, our view is that breaking up the banks
is fully justified on the grounds that such a breakup would make the economy
safer and more stable by limiting or eliminating the proclivity of regulators and
elected officials to engineer massive bailouts of the largest financial institutions
whenever a financial crisis appears.
We recognize, however, that our plan involves a sea change in the current
U.S. approach to antitrust policy, which generally embraces the idea that the
only appropriate concern of antitrust law is to promote and protect
competition so that the prices paid by consumers will be as low as possible.
And, clearly, antitrust law is designed to protect competition from price-fixing
and other anticompetitive behavior."
Interchange fees are the fees that the banks of the customers who use credit cards (known as
the "issuing" banks) charge to the banks of the merchants that accept credit cards (known as
the "acquiring" banks). The interchange fees paid by acquiring banks are passed along to
the merchants. As a result of banks' interchange fees (and other fees charged by the card
companies themselves), merchants receive less than ioo% of the price of goods and services
that are paid for with credit cards instead of cash. Different types of cards (affinity cards)
have higher fees than other "no-frills" cards do. See Andrew Martin, Visa's Strategy in Debit
Cards: Push Up Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2oo, at Ai. These card networks' practices,
including interchange fees, have been the subject of past and current investigations under
the antitrust laws. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-45, CREDIT CARDS:
RISING INTERCHANGE FEES HAVE INCREASED COSTS FOR MERCHANTS, BUT OPTIONS FOR
REDUCING FEES POSE CHALLENGES (200o), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/gao
-10-45. In 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice brought a civil suit against the two largest
credit card companies, Visa and MasterCard, for alleged antitrust violations regarding,
among other things, rules imposed by the companies that forbade banks from issuing rival
Discover and American Express cards. The court found an antitrust violation and enjoined
such practices. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003).
70. See In re NASDAQMkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 184 F.R.D. 5o6 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Arthur
M. Kaplan, Antitrust as a Public-Private Partnership: A Case Study of the Nasdaq Litigation, 52
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 111 (2001). This massive litigation was prompted by an important
article, William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQMarket Makers Avoid Odd-
Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813 (1994). This article identified and described what appeared to
be collusive behavior by the large investment banks that made markets in stocks listed on
the NASDAQstock market. Id. at 1835. At the time, stock prices were quoted in fractions,
with the smallest permissible quotation being one-eighth of a point or $0.125. Though
dealer firms were permitted to buy and sell shares on any eighth they chose, the Christie-
Shultz study found that odd-eighth quotes were "virtually nonexistent" among one hundred
of the most active stocks in 1991. Id. at 1813-14. Ignoring odd-eighth quotes permitted the
colluding dealers to receive a mimmum 25-cent spread between the bid price and the offered
price for these stocks, which was twice as large as the permissible 12.5-cent spread. Id. at
1814.
71. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984)
("[W] hether the ultimate finding is the product of a presumption or actual market analysis,
the essential inquiry remains the same-whether or not the challenged restraint enhances
competition."); United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963) ("[C]ompetition
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Those who subscribe to this approach to the antitrust laws might view it as
inappropriate to burden antitrust with the competing goal of promoting the
economic stability of financial institutions. After all, the antitrust laws were not
written with stability in mind, and scholars have not tried to incorporate
stability into their analyses.
We have three responses to this criticism. First, to the extent that one
considers it important that the antitrust laws remain pure in their single-
minded focus on competition, we note that we are suggesting a new statute.
We are not suggesting that any current antitrust laws or regulations or judicial
outcomes be revised or reinterpreted. Second, because our proposed approach
applies only to financial institutions, we do not view it as a new antitrust law so
much as we view it as a new law for financial institutions. And there can be no
disagreement with the point that financial stability is a central focus, if not the
central focus, of the law of financial institutions. Therefore, while we think that
it might be preferable to have the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission enforce the regulatory regime that we
advocate, this regime could also be implemented by financial institutions'
regulators (subject, of course, to the not-insignificant problem of regulatory
capture by the financial institutions of their various regulators72 ).
Finally, we note that while the policy of protecting price competition has
much to recommend it, this is by no means the only approach that one might
take to antitrust policy, as students of Louis D. Brandeis73 and William 0.
Douglas74 are well aware. Moreover, when it comes to banking, antitrust rules
is our fundamental national economic policy . . . "); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231,
248 (1951) ("The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of
competition."); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941)
("Under the Sherman Act 'competition not combination, should be the law of trade."'
(quoting Nat'l Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 129 (1905))).
72. See, e.g., Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, Striking Regulatory Irons While Hot 5 (Sept. 13,
2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid= 15234 28 ("Capture theory provides insights into how the financial,
economic and political environments combined to enable credit card companies to impose
sizable fees and dramatic increases in interest rates ..... ).
73. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-63 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(articulating concerns about "encroachment upon the liberties and opportunities of the
individual" and "corporate domination" of political life). "For Brandeis, antitrust was an
expression of the political economy of citizenship, concerned with preserving an economy of
small, independent producers." MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA
IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 24o (1996); see also Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914) (expressing strong antimonopoly views).
74. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 320-21 (1949) (Douglas, J.)
("[W]e can expect that the oil companies will move to supplant [small independent gas
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have always made exceptions. Generally, however, such exceptions have
favored permitting anticompetitive banking mergers that would not be
permitted for other sorts of firms. Specifically, under the Bank Merger Act,
even if a merger is anticompetitive, it may be allowed if bank regulators find
that "the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in
meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served."7
Nor is it anomalous to place a heavy emphasis on stability when
promulgating bank regulation. Financial stability has long been a factor in
banking regulation, just as financial stability has historically been an important
principle in antitrust policy.76 Ironically, in the past, it was generally thought -
erroneously, in our view-that greater consolidation in the banking sector
would lead to greater stability. Even when the government was vigorously
enforcing the antitrust laws, the banking sector was left untouched because
antitrust policy was seen as "subordinate to stability concerns."77
As Bernard Shull observed, it makes sense that the stability concerns about
banks and issues related to bank supervision should require that a different
antitrust policy be directed toward banks. Congressional action, such as the
refusal to include banks in the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the
Clayton Act, reflected a "determination to deal with banking differently. The
extent of the differential treatment for mergers and acquisitions in banking was
the subject of congressional debates . . . undertaken within the context of a
service stations] with their own stations. There will still be competition between the oil
companies. But there will be a tragic loss to the nation. The small, independent business
man will be supplanted by clerks.").
75. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (2006). Shortly after the Act was passed, Justice Douglas
described the Bank Merger Act as "the product of powerful contending forces." United
States v. First City Nat'l Bank of Hous., 386 U.S. 361, 367 (1967).
76. Kaden, supra note 65, at 7-8.
77. Id. at 6.
78. The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, 64 Star. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 5§ 18, 21 (1958)),
amended the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 730 (codified in scattered sections of 1s
U.S.C. (20o6)), which in turn had itself been an amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act
of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §5 1-7). The Celler-Kefauver Act
closed a loophole in the Clayton Act that previously had prevented antitrust inquiry into and
enforcement of certain acquisitions of assets (rather than stocks) and acquisitions involving
firms that were not direct competitors. The Clayton Act had prohibited corporate mergers
that resulted in reduced competition, but the Act could easily be avoided prior to the Celler-
Kefauver Act by structuring an acquisition as a purchase of assets rather than a merger that
involved the purchase of stock in the target company. The Celler-Kefauver Act prohibited
asset purchases that would cause a reduction in competition. 64 Stat. at 1125-26.
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widespread belief that the antitrust laws were largely inapplicable or
impractical and, to an important degree, inappropriate for banking.""
In fact, we believe that the opposite is true. Consolidation has led to
lemming-like behavior and excessive risktaking in institutions that have been
allowed to become so big that politicians and bank regulators could not survive
if they were to permit those institutions to fail.
There have been occasional attempts by regulators to limit bank size, but
Congress has allocated most authority to deal with bank size to friendly bank
regulators rather than to antitrust regulators in the Justice Department or the
Federal Trade Commission. For example, the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 empowered the Federal Reserve to review mergers and acquisitions by
bank holding companies to determine "whether or not the effect of [the
proposal] would be to expand the size or extent of the bank holding company
system involved beyond limits consistent with . . . the preservation of
competition."so
It remains the case, however, that unlike other mergers, bank mergers will
be permitted, even if they are anticompetitive, as long as they promote the
public's interest in stability. The Bank Merger Act exempted existing bank
mergers, including those in pending government suits, from section i of the
Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act. In the 1966 amendments to the
Bank Merger Act, banking agencies were prohibited from approving mergers
"whose effect . . . may be substantially to lessen competition," or that would
79. Bernard Shull, The Origins of Antitrust in Banking: An Historical Perspective, 41 ANTITRUST
BULL. 255, 265 (1996).
8o. Bank Holding Company Act § 3(c), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). The statute relegated the Department of Justice to an advisory role providing that it
and certain other agencies could submit advisory opinions on competitive issues for the
Federal Reserve to consider during the merger approval process. It took the Supreme Court,
in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), to change matters. In that
opinion, the Court held that section 7 of the Clayton Act, as well as the Sherman Act, were
applicable to all bank mergers. Id. at 355 ("It would be anomalous to conclude that Congress,
while intending the Sherman Act to remain fully applicable to bank mergers, and § 7 of the
Clayton Act to remain fully applicable to pure stock acquisitions by banks, nevertheless
intended § 7 to be completely inapplicable to bank mergers.").
81. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2006). These provisions reflected Congress's displeasure with certain
Supreme Court bank antitrust decisions. See United States v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville,
390 U.S. 171, 177 (1968) ("Congress was evidently dissatisfied with the 1960 Bank Merger
Act as that Act was interpreted in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963), and in United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665
(1964), and wished to alter both the procedures by which the Justice Department challenges
bank mergers and the legal standard which courts apply in judging those mergers.").
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result "in restraint of trade.""' And, as noted above, even when a merger is
anticompetitive, regulators may nonetheless approve it if they find that "the
anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in
the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the
convenience and needs of the community to be served."8 ,
Our point here is not to quarrel with the current state of antitrust law as it
relates to banking. We agree with the general notion that regulators and
policymakers should take financial stability concerns into account when
formulating policy in general, particularly when formulating antitrust policy.
However, we believe that longstanding antitrust policy has gotten the issue
precisely backwards, because concerns over financial stability should make
bank regulators and policymakers more inclined to break up banks and to deny
merger applications-not less so. By not factoring in the enormous costs of
bailouts, traditional antitrust analysis leads to a flawed conclusion.
III.TWO PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND THE FINAL LEGISLATIVE
OUTCOME
We readily acknowledge that one cannot implement a policy of breaking up
banks that are Too Big To Fail without clear guidelines that permit regulators
and market participants to delineate the parameters of the policy. Banks must
have a clear rule that enables them to know precisely the limits to their growth.
Further, we believe that the specific contours of the guidelines on bank size
should not appear random. Rather, they should be grounded in some rational
metric.
In this Part, we discuss the "original" Volcker Rule, which was considered
in early stages of the development of the Dodd-Frank bill but ultimately
discarded. This rule also would have broken up banks and is the primary rival
to our proposed rule. We argue that the transformation of the Volcker Rule
from its "original" version to its "as-enacted" version ironically reflects the
political process that transformed the original Too Big To Fail policy into the
ambiguous "too important, too interconnected, too systemically significant,
Too Big To Fail" policy of the Great Recession. We then present our proposed
rule. We argue that our rule provides clear and easy-to-implement guidelines
that are based on a rational metric. Our rule prevents financial institutions'
liability from growing larger than the size of the government's deposit
82. Act of Feb. 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 8o Stat. 7, 8 (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
83. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(s)(B) (20o6).
1396
120:13 68 2011
FAILURE IS AN OPTION
insurance fund. This would prevent financial institutions from growing so
large that their size outstrips the ability of the federal government to unwind
their activities without bailing them out.
A. Paul Volcker's Original Too Big To Fail Rule
In the earliest days of the financial crisis, Treasury Secretary Paulson issued
a series of proposals to restructure the financial regulatory system.54 These
proposals were based on the findings and recommendations of a committee of
former and current regulators and industry executives that the Secretary had
asked to rethink regulation with a view to creating a market that was at once
more efficient and more competitive with foreign markets.
More recently, President Obama modified these proposals to include a
couple of ideas aimed to limit institutions from becoming Too Big To Fail.
These ideas were championed by Paul Volcker, a former Federal Reserve Board
chairman and the current chairman of the President's Economic Recovery
Advisory Board. President Obama called these ideas the "Volcker Rule" and the
name has stuck, even though the "rule" as variously articulated is little more
than a set of objectives."'
In its original formulation, the Volcker Rule had two parts. First, Chairman
Volcker proposed an absolute size limitation for banks. This rule would
prohibit banks from gaining more than a ten percent market share in loans or
deposits. The second part of the rule was a ban on banks' proprietary trading,
trading for their own accounts, or investing in or owning hedge funds, private
equity funds, or proprietary trading operations for their own profit." We refer
to the first part of the Volcker Rule as the "original" Volcker Rule. In its
original incarnation, the second part of the Volcker rule barring proprietary
trading was tantamount to a reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act, at least in
84. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Releases Blueprint for Stronger
Regulatory Structure (Mar. 31, 20o8), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
hp896.htm.
8S. See Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks (Mar. 31, 2008),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp897.htm.
86. See President Barack Obama, Remarks on Financial Reform (Jan. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-financial-reform.
87. See Douglas J. Elliott, The Volcker Rule: Still Problematic, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 4, 2010),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/03o4 volcker-elliott.aspx ("The
'Volcker Rule' should really be expressed in the plural form, because its two aspects are
essentially unrelated . . . . The first part is a . . . size limitation for banks .. . [that] would
prohibit banks from exceeding . .. [a] 1o% market share . . .. The second part of the rule is
a ban on 'proprietary' trading and investments.").
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part."8 Underwriting, investing, hedging, and trading were allowed if they
were for clients of the bank, so Volcker was not proposing a complete return to
Glass-Steagall.
Paul Volcker offered his own interpretation of the Volcker Rule in an
opinion piece published in the New York Times. Volcker began by noting that
"President Obama io days ago set out one important element in the needed
structural reform."8 ' Then, after highlighting that Too Big To Fail had come to
mean that "really large, complex and highly interconnected financial
institutions can count on public support at critical times,"o Volcker went on to
argue that "limit[ing]" ownership or sponsorship of hedge funds, private
equity funds, and other proprietary trading operations would complement
existing capital and regulatory efforts to limit taxpayer exposure. Ironically,
Volcker rejects Adam Smith's advice that banks should be small to limit risk,
only to justify the adoption of his rule on the basis that the risky activities that
he wants to ban "are actively engaged in by only a handful of American mega-
commercial banks, perhaps four or five." 91
When Volcker later considers the risks of pure capital markets firms, his
underlying concerns about Too Big To Fail once again rise to the surface:
What we do need is protection against the outliers. There are a limited
number of investment banks (or perhaps insurance companies or other
firms) the failure of which would be so disturbing as to raise concern
about a broader market disruption. In such cases, authority by a
relevant supervisory agency to limit their capital and leverage would be
important, as the president has proposed.
To put it simply, in no sense would these capital market institutions
be deemed "too big to fail."
At bottom, the Volcker Rule is an attempt to rein in a subset of financial
companies that are Too Big To Fail. Without questioning why regulators of
capital markets firms can set adequate capital requirements and manage the
potential liquidation of these businesses and bank regulators cannot, the
Volcker Rule was intended to limit the risk that "four or five megabanks" will
get into trouble through investing in alternative assets. The bothersome
88. See Louis Uchitelle, Volcker, Loud and Clear, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2010, at BUI.
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presumption underlying the Volcker Rule remains, however, that we are
worried about these four or five megabanks because they are Too Big To Fail.
On March 3, 2010, the Treasury Department provided language to the
Senate Finance Committee to define the limitation on banks' market share-
the core of the "original" Volcker rule-more precisely.93 This limitation
survived various attempts to excise it from the statute and is now reflected in
section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Act.94 In that version of the Volcker Rule, "too
big" was defined as having more than ten percent of the- aggregate risk-
adjusted liabilities of all financial institutions. Conceptually, the idea is not
wholly without merit.
It might appear that this definition provides a limit on bank size that is easy
to ascertain and monitor. And this limit might appear to be a financially
intelligent standard because it focuses on risk-adjusted liabilities rather than
simply on liabilities. But the rule is neither easy to implement nor financially
sensible. Rather, on closer examination, it is clear that this original version of
the Volcker Rule still failed to do much of what was expected. First, there is no
easy way or standard procedure used to measure aggregate risk-adjusted
liabilities. Banks report risk-based assets and risk-adjusted capital in
accordance with the Basel guidelines. However, determining risk-adjusted
liabilities requires calculating, for each of the roughly 8ooo banks in the United
States,95 total risk capital (Tier 1 capital plus qualifying Tier 2 capital)9 6 and
g. See Annette L. Nazareth, Treasury Proposes "Volcker Rule" Legislative Text, HARv. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 16, 2010, 8:o8 AM),
http://blogs.aw.harvard.edu/corpgov/20o/o3/16/treasury-proposes-volcker-rule
-legislative-text; Volcker Rule Proposal: Administration Releases Legislative Language To Restrict
Size and Risky Activities of Financial Firms, FT.CoM (Mar. 3, 2010, 10:54 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/o/cecf7o38-27o6-ldf-8co8-ool44feabdco.html.
94. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 622,
124 Stat. 1376, 1632 (2010).
95. Quarterly Banking Profile: First Quarter 2010, 4 FDIC Q, no. 2, 2010, at 1, available at
http://WWw2.fdic.gov/qbp/201omar/qbp.pdf.
g6. Tier 1 capital, as set forth in the FDIC Statistics on Depository Institutions (SDI), is
identified as Tier i (core) capital and coded as rbctij. In the SDI, Tier i (core) capital
includes: common equity plus noncumulative perpetual preferred stock plus minority
interests in consolidated subsidiaries less goodwill and other ineligible intangible assets. The
amount of eligible intangibles (including mortgage servicing rights) included in core capital
is limited in accordance with supervisory capital regulations. Tier 2 capital in the SDI is
coded as rbct2 and is based on the risk-based capital definitions for prompt corrective action
(PCA). Includible Tier 2 capital components consist of, but are not limited to, limited
subordinated debt, cumulative perpetual preferred stock, allowance for loan and lease losses,
total mandatory convertible debt, and a portion of unrealized gains on available-for-sale
equity securities. The maximum amount of supplementary capital elements that qualifies as
Tier 2 capital is limited to one hundred percent of Tier 1 capital. In addition, the combined
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then subtracting that from total risk-adjusted assets.97 The risk-adjusted
liabilities of other nonbanking financial institutions, like insurance companies
and specialty lenders (as determined by the Financial Stability Oversight
Council created by the Dodd-Frank Act95), would also have to be determined
and added into the aggregate number. The risk adjustments required for these
institutions are to be determined by their various regulators, which are yet to
be determined and (in the case of insurance companies) may vary state by
state. Compounding this problem is the fact that there is currently no single
source for the data of these nonbank financial institutions as there is for the
FDIC-insured depository institutions."
Of course, the lack of data for these other financial institutions may be
moot. Using the data for banks as of December 31, 2009,00 only two banks,
JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, are over the ten percent risk-based
limit-and just barely at that-when the denominator is based solely on banks.
If one were to add into the aggregate just ten other nonbank financial
companies-AIG, MetLife, Prudential, TIAA-CREF, Berkshire Hathaway,
New York Life, Lincoln National, MassMutual, Northwestern Mutual, and
State Farm-then no company would be Too Big To Fail under the Dodd-
Frank Act's new rule.o10 In other words, upon closer look, this rule is neither
easy to use nor effective in its application.
maximum amount of subordinated debt and intermediate-term preferred stock that
qualifies as Tier 2 capital is limited to fifty percent of Tier 1 capital. To calculate Total Risk
Capital, Tier-2-eligible Tier 2 capital up to the amount of Tier 1 capital is added to Tier i
capital. FDIC, Statistics on Depository Institutions, http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index. asp (last
visited Oct. 26, 2oo) [hereinafter SDI].
97. Total risk-adjusted assets as defined in the SDI is based on the risk-based capital definitions
for prompt corrective action (PCA) and includes Call Reporters (gross risk-weighted assets
minus disallowed loan and loss allowance minus allocated transfer risk reserve plus
unrealized loss on equity securities) and Thrift Financial Reporters (total risk-based capital
plus fully capitalized items times 12.5 minus unrealized holding gains or losses on available-
for-sale securities adjusted according to FASB 115). Id.
98. Dodd-Frank Act 5§ 111, 113, 622.
99. It should be noted that the Dodd-Frank Act does not envision the inclusion of either Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac, two of the largest nonbanking financial institutions, in the set of
institutions that would factor into the calculation of risk-based liabilities.
1oo. Data used herein were sourced from the FDIC Statistics on Depository Institutions. SDI,
supra note 96.
101. Using the Dodd-Frank Act's definitions for risk-adjusted liabilities and the December 31,
2009 data published by the FDIC, the largest bank, Bank of America, had $936 billion in
risk-adjusted liabilities, representing approximately 10.7% of total risk-adjusted liabilities
for all banks of $8145 billion. Accordingly, an additional $1219 billion in liabilities in other
financial institutions would push Bank of America's percentage of the total below the 10%
limit. The aggregate liabilities of AIG ($778 billion), MetLife ($5o6 billion), Prudential
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While the inefficacy of the Volcker Rule could, in theory, be remedied by
adjusting the risk-based threshold to a more reasonable number (say eight
percent instead of ten percent), making the Volcker Rule less challenging to
apply will not be done easily. Here, the problem is that the complexity of the
rule requires numerous subjective decisions and interpretations by
regulators.o 2 When compared with the simple, nondiscretionary DIF-based
threshold advocated below, the Volcker Rule's risk-adjusted liability threshold
appears highly malleable. In particular, the many discrete decisions required to
calculate precisely how much to adjust various liabilities, and how those
adjustments should change over time, require financial institutions and their
regulators to make very difficult judgments precisely at moments when their
incentives to make such judgments are at their most perverse. It does not make
sense to require that subjective judgments that likely will result in the breakup
of a major financial institution be made precisely when it has been determined
that the institution's liabilities may be riskier than previously thought. And,
importantly, it should not be lost in the discussion of risk-based liabilities that,
in accordance with Basel II guidelines currently in effect for U.S. banks, the
initial and presumptively accurate determination of risk is made by the
management of each institution.
As the Dodd-Frank Act made its way through the legislative process and
initial ideas and language gave way to compromise and modification, Paul
($455 billion), TIAA-CREF ($360 billion), New York Life ($174 billion), Berkshire
Hathaway ($166 billion), Lincoln National ($165 billion), MassMutual ($164 billion),
Northwestern Mutual ($154 billion), and State Farm ($125 billion), which total $3050
billion, far exceed that amount. It should be noted however, that it is unclear how each of
the regulators of these insurance companies might define "risk-based liability," which is of
course another limitation of this concept.
102. In contrast, while the elaborate disclosure regimes mandated by the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 are complex, the sort of complexity embedded
in these statutes is fundamentally different from the sort of complexity embedded in the
original Volcker Rule for two reasons. First, the provisions of the Securities Acts apply in the
same way to all companies. In contrast, the Volcker Rule must be customized to fit the
particular liabilities of each financial institution. This increases the number of calculations as
well as the amount of discretion embedded in the rule. Second, because the provisions of the
Securities Acts require disclosure, it is easy to determine whether the terms of the Acts are
being applied in a uniform way to all companies. This transparency forces regulators to treat
similarly situated financial institutions in the same way. In contrast, the risk adjustments
made under the Volcker Rule generally are quite opaque. For example, as we saw during the
financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, different companies valued similar investments in
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) quite
differently. This appears to be something of which regulators were not aware until very late
in the crisis. See John Carney, Lehman Brothers Was Dramatically Over Valuing Its CDOs,
Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 17, 2010, 12:47 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/lehman-brothers
-was-dramatically-over-valuing-its-cdos-2o10-3.
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Volcker reflected on the Volcker Rule as it evolved, saying that it "went from
what is best to what could be passed."'o3 According to the New York Times,
Chairman Volcker was not alone in his assessment of the political process and
his notion of how to prevent the next financial crisis: "Representative Barney
Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat who is chairman of the House Financial
Services Committee, subscribes to that view. He says that there are stronger
measures he would have preferred to see in the bill, including the original
version of the Volcker rule, but that political reality dictated otherwise."o0 4
With the benefit of several decades of study and experience, Paul Volcker
summed up his assessment of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Volcker Rule as
finally incorporated with an observation that we wholly endorse. "'There is a
certain circularity in all of this business,' he concedes. 'You have a crisis,
followed by some kind of reform, for better or worse, and things go well for a
while, and then you have another crisis."'"o" We agree with Mr. Volcker's
assessment as far as it goes but think that a more accurate statement of the
circularity would be: you have a crisis, followed by a bailout and some kind of
reform, for better or worse, and things go well for a while, and then you have
another crisis -and another bailout.
In its original formulation, the Volcker Rule addressed Too Big To Fail
both directly, with a size limitation, and indirectly, through the logic that only
a "handful of megabanks" had significant proprietary operations in derivatives
and alternative investments. To be sure, this second aspect of the original
Volcker Rule was also an attempt to address the more current "too
interconnected" and "too significant" extensions of Too Big To Fail. Ironically,
by trying to fine-tune the Volcker Rule to address the latest interpretations and
extensions of Too Big To Fail, the Volcker Rule became more vulnerable to the
political process. In concept, a simple prohibition on proprietary trading in
asset classes that were seen as both risky and at the center of the financial crisis
would seem to have merit. However, for the same reasons that Paul Volcker
saw this rule as tied to Too Big To Fail (that is, only a handful of megabanks
were involved), it was clear from the beginning that this indirect attempt to
limit big banks was not going to survive the political process. In the end, the
Dodd-Frank Act limitation that no bank could invest more than three percent
of its Tier i capital in proprietary trading in derivatives or be invested in hedge
funds and other alternative investments (without limiting management and
incentive fees) poses little meaningful limitation on the riskiness of big banks
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or their interconnectedness or systemic importance. More importantly, from
our perspective, is that the focus on this "hot" issue distracted and confused the
discussion of the core issue of Too Big To Fail so much that many have
forgotten that there was an original Volcker Rule at all. And with that loss of
focus, as we have argued, the real Too Big To Fail limitation of the Dodd-
Frank Act (in section 622) ended up failing to place limits on becoming too big.
B. Our Proposal: The Bright-Line Limit
As an alternative to the original Volcker Rule, one of us has articulated a
different way of avoiding the problem of Too Big To Fail."o' The goal of the
rule is to provide a more credible approach that is a simple-to-understand,
simple-to-implement, and simple-to-monitor method to limit bailouts.
The bright-line rule would limit the total liabilities of any bank, bank
holding company, or other financial institution1o7 to 5% of the targeted level of
io6. See Jonathan Macey, Financial Reform: It's the Politics, POLITICO, Feb. 3, 2010,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/o21o/32397.html. As originally formulated, the
bright-line rule we are proposing had two parts. First, no financial institution would be
permitted to have total liabilities that were in excess of 5% of the FDIC deposit insurance
fund. The second part of the rule that Macey proposed in Politico provided that no financial
institution would be permitted to have debt that was more than 8o% of its equity capital,
that is, a 20% capital-to-asset ratio. The bright-line rule presented here is a significant
modification of the original rule proposed by Macey. It involves a more objective and
nuanced limitation on bank size and drops the requirement that banks maintain equity
levels of 20%. The rule here is even simpler and easier to implement than the original. Like
the original idea, we favor this approach on the grounds that "only one structural change
could work: We need to break up the banks into sufficiently small pieces that are no longer
too big to fail, and instead are too small to rescue. Banks' liabilities are easiest to deal with
when limited to a reasonable size." Id. For other articles developing the basic ideas suggested
in this Feature, see Jonathan Macey, Break Up the Wall Street Banks. Now.,
REALCLEARPOLITICS (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2o1o/o4/20/
break up-the-wall street banks now_105228.html; Jonathan Macey, Obama's Financal
Reform Falls Short, POLITICO, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/oio/
31855.html.
107. Of course, by including all financial institutions as well as banks and bank holding
companies within our plan, we recognize that the term "financial institution" must be
defined. We would embrace a variation of the definition of the term "financial institution"
contained in the Dodd-Frank Act. That statute defines a financial institution to mean any
broker or dealer, depository institution, futures commission merchant, bridge financial
company, or any other institution determined by the FDIC to be a financial institution.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 210(c)(9)(D)(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1491 (2010). We would add insurance companies, hedge
funds, and private equity firms to this definition, keeping in mind that our proposed rule
does not apply to any company of any kind, financial or otherwise, unless the institution's
total liabilities exceed 0.0575% of the targeted value of the Deposit Insurance Fund
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the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund for the current year as reported by the
FDIC. o, For 2010, the targeted level of the DIF is 1.15% of total deposits
insured by the FDIC. Accordingly, under the test proposed here, the limit on
total liabilities would be set at 0.0575% of total insured deposits. As of
December 31, 2009, the most recent date for which detailed deposit
information is available, total deposits equaled $9.23 trillion and estimated
total insured deposits equaled $5.38 trillion. Thus, under our approach,
maximum total liabilities for a financial institution in 2010 would be $3.o96
billion.
Also, we point out that nothing in our proposal envisions, or even suggests,
any need to reimpose regulations on banks' physical locations and types of
activities. Rather, our proposed approach does not require any restrictions on
activities of banks or on the location of those activities of any kind. Our only
restriction is on the size of financial institutions.
Before considering how this rule would affect existing financial
institutions, it is worth considering the merits of a bright-line rule. It can be
objectively verified by nonregulators and can be applied evenhandedly and in
advance of trouble. The bright-line test that we propose treats all parties
equally. It does not chase risky business across the financial landscape as the
Volcker Rule would and Glass-Steagall did. It makes resolution reasonable and
a certainty. It is easy to implement and monitor. There are no complex
computer models, risk-based calculations, or Value at Risk measures to debate
with armies of lawyers, accountants, and financial engineers.
Undoubtedly, the bright-line rule that we propose will be subject to
criticism that it would not allow the United States to have the big financial
institutions that are necessary to compete with the big banks of Europe and
Asia or to provide the big balance sheets that large companies want. Some of
this criticism is, of course, valid. Some business will be lost. On the other hand,
much of the criticism of the proposed rule is really just an articulation of the
reasons that brought us Too Big To Fail and the Great Recession.
(currently set at i.i% of total insured deposits; that is, approximately $3.096 billion). We
see no problem with the fact that many, perhaps most, of the firms subject to the bright-line
rule that we propose are not FDIC-insured banks. The critical point is that all of these
financial institutions enjoy implicit government protection, even if they do not have explicit
insurance from the FDIC. The targeted value of the DIF is simply used as a metric, and it is
just as useful a metric for non-FDIC-insured financial institutions as it is for FDIC-insured
financial institutions.
io8. For background on the DIF, see supra note 15. The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 2105(a)(3)(B), 120 Stat. 9, 14 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
5 1817(b)(3)(B) (20o6)), also established a range of i.i5% to 1.50% within which the FDIC
Board of Directors may set the Designated Reserve Ratio (DRR).
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To determine how our bright-line rule might work in practice, we used the
Statistics on Depository Institutions (SDI) database of the FDIC as of
December 31, 2009."o9 Initially, we sorted all banks and bank holding
companies in order of aggregate liabilities. Then, using the calculated
aggregate liabilities limit of $3.o96 billion, we segmented the population into
two groups: (i) those with aggregate liabilities in excess of the pro forma limit
("Big Banks") and (2) those with aggregate liabilities equal to or below the pro
forma limit ("Small Banks").
As of December 31, 2009, there were a total of 8022 banking institutions
whose deposits were insured by the FDIC.'10 Of these, 233, or roughly 3%, were
Big Banks, and 7788, or roughly 97%, were Small Banks.
A comparison of these two groups across several balance sheet criteria
provides considerable insight into how we came to the Great Recession and
Too Big To Fail. Figure 1, below, sets forth these measures for Big Banks as a
percentage of all insured banking institutions as of December 31, 2009.1"
Putting the Pareto Principle to shame, the Big Banks, which account for only
3% of the banks by number, represent approximately 83% of total bank assets,
82% of total bank liabilities, 8o% of total deposits, and 84% of total bank
equity. In short, a few Big Banks represent the vast majority of the U.S.
banking business.
These few key statistics tell us significantly more than that, however. The
ratio of total bank equity to total assets and the ratio of total bank equity to
total liabilities are not any better for Big Banks (11.37% and 12.83%
respectively) than they are for Small Banks (io.24% and 11-41%, respectively).
In other words, if there is an advantage in having very large financial
institutions, that advantage is not reflected in creating financial institutions
that are stronger than financial institutions that are significantly smaller -at
least without the generosity of Uncle Sam. If big financial institutions do in
fact provide services and products to large corporate clients that only very large
financial institutions can provide, or if big financial institutions enjoy an
efficiency advantage due to superior scale, then it is reasonable to assume that
they should be able to capture above-normal fees or profits from these
activities. That, in turn, should lead to either a stronger balance sheet and
capital position or higher compensation and higher dividends. The data show
that, if these advantages exist, Big Banks have not used this advantage to build
stronger capital positions. In other words, just as the government-sponsored
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entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have done, the Big Banks have
privatized the gains and socialized the risks of their businesses. To the extent
that these advantages do not make a meaningful difference in the performance
or financial strength of the Big Banks, claiming that these advantages justify
the increased risk associated with these very large banks is similarly
questionable.
The other data set forth in Figure 1 illustrate that, on several other
measures, the Big Banks do not fare as well as their smaller counterparts. For
instance, note that Big Banks have virtually all of the banking sector's trading
liabilities. Trading liabilities, as reported by the FDIC, include liability for
short positions and revaluation losses on interest rate, foreign exchange rate,
and other commodity and equity contracts. In the context of an ever-expanding
Too Big To Fail policy, these trading obligations, whether for clients or for the
house, would be backstopped by taxpayer money.
Figure 1.
BIG BANKS VS. SMALL BANKS: ON SELECTED BALANCE SHEET ITEMS, AS OF
DECEMBER 31, 2009
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Clearly, these trading liabilities are not necessary for conducting a normal
or profitable banking business. Otherwise, we would see Small Banks having at
least their pro rata share of these products. Similarly, the Big Banks represent
virtually all of the derivatives on bank balance sheets, yet Small Banks have
somehow found a way to survive and prosper without derivatives.
The last category of statistics set forth in Figure i focuses on uninsured
deposits. Prior to the enactment of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008 (EESA)"2 on October 3, 20o8, FDIC insurance was limited to
$100,000 per account per bank (with some exceptions regarding co-
ownership). After enactment of EESA, that limit was raised to $250,000.
Logically, a depositor would not keep money in a bank in excess of the deposit
limit unless he or she thought that there was little risk that the bank would fail
or that, if the bank failed, the government would pay off his or her claim
notwithstanding the formal limitations of FDIC insurance. That is, the
depositer was betting on Too Big to Fail.
The FDIC has a couple of measures that are helpful in assessing uninsured
deposits. One, identified by the FDIC as iddepsam, denotes the aggregate dollar
amount of deposits in insured domestic accounts (other than retirement
accounts). Iddepsam is set forth in Figure 1 simply as "Insured Deposits." At the
opposite end of this spectrum are accounts that are not expressly insured by the
FDIC, although it is the support of these large deposits that gave rise to the
Too Big To Fail policy in the first place. The FDIC identifies these as iddeplam.
In Figure 1, "Deposits 25 0K or more" identifies all deposits at the institution
with a balance of $250,000 or more regardless of type, location, or application
of insurance rules.
These measures collectively provide a consistent message. First, Big Banks
have, in aggregate, about 8o% of all deposits but only about 72% of the
accounts that the FDIC estimates are covered by the new $250,000 limit. These
concentrations are both large, to be sure, particularly when Big Banks represent
only 3% of all banks. However, they represent proportionately less than the
overall market share for Big Banks. In other words, those who are potentially
eligible for deposit insurance have proportionately more of their money in
Small Banks. A Too Big To Fail resolution of these Big Banks would
accordingly provide a rescue to a disproportionately large number of uninsured
depositors. In contrast, Big Banks have approximately 83% of the deposits of
$250,000 or more. These deposits include large institutional and corporate
accounts, as well as the accounts of wealthy individuals who can afford to
12. Pub. L. No. 110-343, Div. A, 122 Stat. 3765, 3765 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 &
26 U.S.C. (200,6)).
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diversify and seek safety elsewhere. These are sophisticated people who well
understand that their accounts are not formally insured. These are also people
who know how to read a balance sheet and assess the capital structure and
financial strength of the banks with which they do business. They know that
Big Banks have engineered more leverage into their structures and are
positioned to pay out proportionately more to shareholders and executives.
They also are well aware of Too Big To Fail, particularly after the Capital
Purchase Program's infusions of capital and declarations of the importance of
Big Banks to the U.S. economy.
C. Criticisms ofthe Bright-Line Rule
The application of our bright-line rule would, no doubt, send a shock wave
through the banking establishment. We fully acknowledge that implementing
our rule not only would be disruptive but also would introduce operating
inefficiencies into the world of finance because breaking up large financial
institutions might lead to higher costs if economies of scale are diminished in
these breakups. Despite these risks, however, the breakups that we advocate
may make U.S. banks more competitive globally and return the United States
to the local banking model that existed prior to the 198os when financial
institutions offered only a limited range of financial products."'
We have a number of responses to potential criticisms of our proposed
breakup plan. First, we acknowledge that the transition will not be easy.
However, a reasonable transition period of perhaps eighteen months to two
years would allow for an orderly restructuring of the Big Banks. These Big
Banks could be reorganized into as many Small Banks as necessary to meet our
proposed test. These banks could be spun out to existing shareholders, sold to
others, or sold in public offerings. These banks could enter into operating and
service agreements with each other or with newly created operating service
companies. Such strategies would address most of the issues associated with
the supposed efficiencies of Big Banks. Similarly, smaller banks could work
together to underwrite and syndicate large loans for large corporate clients.
One can easily envision a reversal of the mergers and acquisitions activity of
the past thirty years bringing back the local and regional bank. The reversal of
prior consolidations may, in fact, retain much of the value that those strategies
envisioned. A Chase New Haven or a Bank of America (Greenwich) may allow
113. See Philip E. Strahan, The Real Effects of U.S. Banking Deregulation, FED. RES. BANK ST.
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shareholders to retain the benefits of branding. Best practices and pooled
processing and technologies may similarly preserve many of the synergies of
consolidation, without the risks of having Big Banks that cannot be liquidated.
Second, as mentioned above, we fully acknowledge that breaking up the
nation's largest financial institutions likely will create costly inefficiencies.
Legislation will be required to implement a breakup plan. Litigation may
result. However, the relatively simple metric used in our proposal to determine
the outer size of financial institutions will reduce the transaction costs
associated with implementing our proposal. And, at the end of the day, the
relevant policy question is not whether our plan has costs; rather, the relevant
issue is whether the benefits of implementing our proposal are greater than the
costs. Moreover, the truly enormous, immediate, direct, long-lasting out-of-
pocket expenses associated with bailouts of financial institutions are clear. The
potential costs of our plan, which come in the form of forgone efficiencies of an
unspecified kind, are ephemeral and can be reduced by innovation and
competition.
Furthermore, while there is a consensus among economists that limitations
on banks' activities are highly inefficient, there is no similar consensus
regarding the existence of economies of scale in banking. The term "economy
of scale" refers to the concept that producers sometimes can lower the average
cost of producing a unit of output by increasing their size. The issue of whether
there are significant economies of scale in banking has been a subject of great
interest to economists, to regulators, and, of course, to managers and owners of
financial institutions."4 In fact, an entire generation of studies has found that
large banks do not have inherent operating cost advantages relative to smaller
banks."' Other, more recent studies suggest that there may be economies of
scale in banking; however, it is far from clear that these efficiencies come from
merging the largest banks. Rather, it appears that small- and medium-sized
banks may enjoy significant cost savings from expansion and mergers, while
larger banks do not."' Recent research finds that "the largest sized banks are
generally the least efficient banks and the smallest sized banks are the most
114. See, e.g., James E. Wilcox, Economies of Scale and Continuing Consolidation of Credit Unions
(Fed. Res. Bank of S.F. Econ. Letter, No. 2005-29, 2005), available at
http://frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2oo5/el2005-29.html.
115. See James Kolari & Asghar Zardkoohi, Further Evidence on Economies of Scale and Scope in
Commercial Banking, O.J. Bus. & ECON., Autumn 1991, at 82, 82-83 (citing other studies that
conclude that larger banks lack economies of scale).
116. See, e.g., Fadzlan Sufian, The Efficiency Effects ofBank Mergers and Acquisitions in a Developing
Economy: Evidence from Malaysia, INT'L J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS & QUANTITATIVE STUD.,
Oct.-Dec. 2004, at 53, 70 ("[T]he results indicate an alternative policy prescription that the
largest banks should shrink to benefit from scale advantages.").
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efficient.""' Importantly, while two prominent scholars, Allen Berger and
David Humphrey, found large inefficiencies in the banking system, they
concluded that such inefficiencies were generated by operational factors, rather
than a lack of sufficient economies of scale or scope."' In fact, many cost
studies find diseconomies of scale in larger banks. 19
Those who disfavor our approach might well point to the merger activity
during recent years as proof that the market prefers larger banks. We do
recognize that banks and bank holding companies have been engaged in
significant merger and acquisition activities over the past several decades.
During the period from 1994 to 2003, there were 3517 mergers among
commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, and industrial
banks alone. 2o These mergers involved the acquisition of approximately $3.1
trillion in assets, $2.1 trillion in deposits, and 47,300 offices during a ten-year
period.' 2 ' However, this consolidation in the banking market cannot
automatically be attributed to a drive for efficiencies. As we point out in this
Feature, larger banks have advantages over smaller banks that have nothing to
do with efficiency: because large banks are more likely to be bailed out than
small banks, large banks enjoy lower costs of funds because large depositors
inevitably prefer to deal with institutions whose liabilities are implicitly
guaranteed by the government.
Among the numerous ideas proposed to reform financial regulation are
several alternative measures designed to avoid bailouts. Two that seem to
garner the most support are enhanced authority to manage a resolution of a
large institution and "living wills" for financial institutions, and indeed both of
these ideas made it into the final version of the Dodd-Frank Act.m1 2 Both of
these ideas involve breaking up large institutions, including Big Banks, in
117. Simeon Papadopoulos, New Evidence on Efficiency in Scandinavian Banking, INT'L REs. J. FIN.
& ECON., Sept. 20o8, at 34, 34. Papadopoulos finds that in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden the largest banks were the least efficient during the time period studied. Id.
11s. Allen N. Berger & David B. Humphrey, The Dominance ofInefficiencies over Scale and Product
Mix Economies in Banking, 28 J. MONETARY ECON. 117, 146-47 (1991).
11g. See Papadopoulos, supra note 117, at 35-37.
120. Steven J. Pilloff, Bank Merger Activity in the United States, 1994-2oo3, at 1 (Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Res. Sys., Staff Study No. 176, 2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/2000-present/ss1 7 6.pdf; see also Marcia J.
Staff, Wallace N. Davidson, III & James R. McDonald, Increased Bank Merger Activity:
Causes and Effects, 24 Am. Bus. L.J. 67, 67 (1986) (providing merger data for the period 1978-
83).
121. Pilloff, supra note 120, at 1.
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times of financial distress and difficult markets. These would be liquidations
under duress and with considerable time pressure, as depositors and creditors
would be worried about their money. One can also only imagine the debates
over "mark-to-liquidation" values in these living wills after the furor over
"mark-to-market" in the heat of the Great Recession.12
Our bright-line rule would allow for this restructuring to take place
gradually over time. This would allow individual financial institutions to find
the solutions that work best for them. Innovation and creative solutions would
take place to transform Big Banks into Small Banks in the best ways. One
bank's experience would become another bank's education. By contrast, a
single agency put in charge of bank liquidation will not lead to innovation.
Secret living wills in constant need of update and revision will not spread
knowledge. One can almost see the frustration, as innovation is stifled waiting
for manuals and procedures that are being finalized on how to reverse that
innovation, should the bank fail. In short, if we cannot break up the Big Banks
in times of tranquility and over time, we would never succeed when we are
"staring into the abyss."
Another alternative to the approach that we propose involves attempting to
prevent financial institutions from taking excessive risks by enacting and
enforcing bright-line rules such as "all financial institutions must maintain a
tangible common equity ratio of at least lo%" or "banks cannot lend to
borrowers whose FICO score is below 700."' There are at least two problems
with this alternative approach. First, there is no guarantee that these
restrictions would work to reduce risk. Limiting banks' activities could make
banks more risky by reducing their ability to diversify their activities and by
reducing their ability to innovate. In addition, there is no assurance that banks
could not create ways to leverage or otherwise increase the traditional risk
123. In the end, for many asset classes, including collateralized mortgage obligations, real estate
mortgage investment conduits, and collateralized debt obligations, the Federal Reserve
became the sole or largest purchaser. For these and other similar assets, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board, pursuant to its statements 115-2 and 124-2, provided relief
from mark-to-market accounting rules that would otherwise apply. See FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., RECOGNITION AND PRESENTATION OF OTHER-THAN-TEMPORARY
IMPAIRMENTS (2009), http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?pagename=FASB
%2FDocumentC%2FDocumentPage&cid=1n76154545419. It is difficult to understand how
banks could maintain living wills with valuations that would be useful in a real liquidation.
124. Cf Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Making Banking Boring, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 10, 2009, at A23
("[Policy makers are] not at all ready to do what needs to be done-which is to make
banking boring again.").
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levels associated with the supposedly safe alternatives left open to them under
such an approach. 25
Of course, at an extreme level, such regulation might work. For example, if
banks were limited to investing in government-guaranteed debt instruments
such as U.S. Treasury bills, then the banks would become quite safe, but they
would cease to play any role in providing capital to the economy. Such a
regulation would be analogous to the government providing everyone with
auto insurance, then enacting a national speed limit of fifteen miles per hour.
This approach would fix the moral hazard problem, but the costs would be
much greater than the benefits. As Alan Greenspan once observed, "A perfectly
safe bank, holding a portfolio of Treasury bills, is not doing the economy or its
shareholders any good. ",26
Application of the bright-line rule proposed here would do much to
advance our collective understanding of the role of banks in our financial
system. Much has changed in the past few decades. Treasury Secretary
Paulson's financial reform proposals, as well as the proposals of President
Obama, the Senate Finance Committee, and the House Financial Services
Committee, have all emphasized that it is time to restructure our financial
regulatory system to address the changes that have occurred in the industry
itself.
Deposit insurance has long been justified on the basis that it protects the
savings of small savers. This basis and the perverse history described in Part I
gave rise to Too Big To Fail and the expansion of financial protection to all
manner of claimants. As of December 31, 2009, total deposits in all banks
amounted to $9.2 trillion with about 58% of that, or approximately $5.3
trillion, benefitting from deposit insurance. As of February 12, 2010, uninsured
money-market mutual funds, a common short-term bank deposit substitute,
amounted to $3.2 trillion. This is after the extraordinary temporary guarantee
measures of the EESA and the Gold Reserve Act had lapsed. If function should
determine regulatory treatment, one can only hope that Too Big To Fail does
not migrate to the mutual fund and investment securities industry as a whole.
To be clear, we are not advocating either that or the elimination of deposit
125. For example, banks that could only lend to borrowers with high FICO scores could simply
lend more to such borrowers than they would otherwise. And rules requiring certain
minimum capital levels are notoriously easy to manipulate through accounting gimmicks.
Furthermore, they do not limit the risks that banks take on the asset side of the balance
sheet by buying risky assets and lending to risky borrowers.
126. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Conference of State Banking




FAILURE IS AN OPTION
insurance. We are merely pointing out that there are many opportunities for
expansion of an investor-saver safety net, and as a result there will be many
who will argue in favor of this and against any efforts to limit its potential
application.
Finally, we think that a downsizing of Big Banks will not mean that U.S.
banks will be disadvantaged in the international banking market. First,
syndication remains a viable option. In fact, it is the collective power of
taxpayers that bailed out the financial system in the Great Recession. Second,
during the 198os and early 199os, many U.S. banks were much more heavily
regulated - and the scope of their activities more highly constrained -than the
much larger "universal banks" in Europe and Asia;' this was viewed as a dire
threat to the competitiveness of U.S. banks.' Nevertheless, the U.S. economy
and financial markets, though volatile, prospered during this period.' Lastly,
we note that there is no way to distinguish the hypothesis that the very largest
financial institutions have competitive advantages over their smaller rivals
127. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, iooth Cong. (1987),
reprinted in 74 FED. RES. BULL. 91, 93 (1988), where Alan Greenspan argued that the Glass-
Steagall Act, which separated commercial banking from securities trading and underwriting,
should be repealed because
[d]evelopments in computer and communications technology have reduced the
economic role of commercial banks and enhanced the function of investment
banking. These permanent and fundamental changes in the environment for
conducting financial business cannot be halted . .. and the longer the law refuses
to recognize that fundamental and permanent changes have occurred, the less
relevant it will be.
128. As a consequence, regulators, particularly Alan Greenspan, favored expanding the powers of
U.S. banks, particularly in the area of underwriting corporate securities, because the
international competitiveness of large U.S. banks was threatened. See Charles W. Calomiris,
The Regulatory Record of the Greenspan Fed, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 170, 171 tbl.i (2006) (listing
regulatory reforms advocated by the Federal Reserve during Greenspan's tenure as
Chairman); see also Thomas F. Cargill & Thomas Mayer, U.S. Deposit Insurance Reform,
CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUEs, July 1992, at 95, 95 ("Early in 1991, the U.S. Treasury proposed to
reform deposit insurance, expand bank powers, establish interstate banking, and reorganize
the regulatory structure. The Treasury rationalized the expanded bank powers as necessary
to give U.S. banks a firmer financial foundation and the means to remain internationally
competitive in an environment of rapidly growing Japanese banks and the economic
unification of Europe.").
129. For one measure of this robustness, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, a commonly watched
measure of U.S. economic activity, grew from 882 points at the beginning of 1982 to 3301
points at the end of 1992, notwithstanding a downturn between those dates. See Historical
Prices: Dow Jones Industrial Average, YAHoo! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=ADJI
(last visited Oct. 5, 2010); see also Eugene N. White, The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929
Revisited, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 67 (comparing the 1987 stock market crash and
subsequent recovery to the Great Depression).
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because they enjoy certain operational efficiencies from the hypothesis that the
very largest banks have competitive advantages because they are directly or
indirectly being supported by the government and the taxpayers in the form of
contingent guarantees of their liabilities. If there were a way for the largest
banks credibly to commit to not being bailed out, we would have no objection
to banks growing to any size. The problem is that no such precommitment
device is available. 30
To put the potential costs of our plan in perspective, consider the massive
cost of the last federal bailout. While it is difficult to quantify precisely the total
cost of the complex panoply of bailout programs put into place in the wake of
the crisis, all agree that the costs were massive and unprecedented.' 3 1 By one
estimate, the U.S. government and the Federal Reserve "spent, lent or
committed $12.8 trillion, an amount that approaches the value of everything
produced in the country last year, to stem the longest recession since the
1930s.""' In per capita terms, the cost of the bailout amounts to $42,105 for
every person of any age in the United States and is fourteen times greater than
the total value of all U.S. currency in circulation."13
While it is impossible to estimate with precision how much the bailout
ultimately will cost, and while we acknowledge that there are many estimates,
some of which are substantially lower than $12.8 trillion, it is clear that, no
matter the cost of the bright-line breakup rule that we propose, the costs of the
bailouts that inevitably follow giant bank failures in today's regulatory
environment are far higher.3 4
130. For a discussion of the inability of governments in democracies to make credible
commitments to refrain from bailing out depositors and an argument that deposit insurance
represents an attempt to limit the government's potential exposure to loss in the case of
bank failure, see generally Macey, supra note 40.
131. Among the largest of these programs is the $1 trillion Public-Private Investment Program
(designed to help investors buy distressed loans and other assets from U.S. banks) and $5oo
billion in government guarantees to the FDIC (to enable the agency to guarantee up to $2
trillion worth of debt for participants in the Term Asset-Backed Lending Facility and the
Public-Private Investment Program). See Mark Pittman & Bob Ivry, Financial Rescue Nears
GDP as Pledges Top $12.8 Trillion (Updatei), BLOOMBERG, Mar. 31, 2009,
http://preview.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive-enio&sid=armozfkwtCA4.
132. Id.
133. Id. The total value of U.S. currency in circulation is $899.8 billion. Id.
134. $4.72 trillion has been disbursed under various programs, but with some funds repaid, $2.01
trillion remains outstanding. $13.86 trillion represents the maximum level of taxpayer funds
that were ever at risk, though this figure is lower now because current government
commitments to certain programs have been reduced since the crisis. Mary Bottari, Bailout
Not Over, Taxpayers Still Owed $2 Trillion in Federal Reserve Loans and TARP Program Funds,
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Table 1.
FEDERAL RESERVE AND GOVERNMENT BAILOUT COMMITMENTS (IN BILLIONS)"'
LIMAIT MARCH 2009





* The FDIC's commitment to guarantee lending under the Legacy Loan Program and
the Legacy Asset Program includes a $Soo billion line of credit from the U.S. Treasury
Moreover, to the direct costs of the bailouts we also must add the indirect
economic costs of the bailout. These costs, which come in the form of
decreased credit availability, the distraction of banking and government
officials involved in the crisis, and the off-balance-sheet costs of the monetary
policy put in place to contain the crisis, are incalculable."'
Finally, we note that, while the final price tag for the bailout will be
massive, it likely will not be out of line with the bailouts that have accompanied
other financial crises around the world. An IMF study of forty financial crises
estimated that the average cost of resolving a financial crisis was an astonishing
13.3% of GDP.
137
CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY (Sept. 29, 2010, 7:00 PM),
http://www.prwatch.org/node/9498.
135. Pittman & Ivry, supra note 131.
136. See Joseph Ramelli, The Biggest Cost of the Bailout, SEEKING ALPHA (May 4, 2010),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/2027o8-the-biggest-cost-of-the-bailout. As one journalist
has observed, "[T]he direct costs of the bailout are dwarfed by the broader political and
economic impact . . . . It likely will take many years for the U.S. to recover from the
economic misery, ballooning U.S. debt, lost tax revenue and political tumult fueled by the
financial crisis." Deborah Solomon, Bailout Looking Much Less Pricey, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12,
2010, at C1.
137. Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database 24 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/o8/224, 2oo8), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/20o8/wpo8224.pdf.
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D. The Dodd-Frank Act
Among the intended results of the Dodd-Frank Act, according to the
official release of the House Committee on Financial Services, was the end of
Too Big To Fail:
Highlights of the Legislation
Ends Too Big to Fail Bailouts: Ends the possibility that taxpayers will
be asked to write a check to bail out financial firms that threaten the
economy by: creating a safe way to liquidate failed financial firms;
imposing tough new capital and leverage requirements that make it
undesirable to get too big; updating the Fed's authority to allow
system-wide support but no longer prop up individual firms; and
establishing rigorous standards and supervision to protect the economy
and American consumers, investors and businesses."'
What is missing is a simple, clear statement of what is "too big." Study of
the roughly 2000 pages of the final version of the Dodd-Frank Act reveals that
what constitutes "big" for a bank or financial institution in the minds of the
legislators is far from clear. For example, in section 115 of the Dodd-Frank Act,
a bank holding company or a nonbank financial institution supervised by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve is defined as being big enough to
merit "more stringent" capital requirements if it has aggregate assets of $50
billion or more, subject to further consideration by the council.139 Similarly,
when defining "big" for the purposes of limiting the ability of bank holding
companies to acquire banks without prior notice, the Dodd-Frank Act uses the
measure of $5o billion in assets. 4 o "Big" is defined in the Act as much smaller
(only $io billion in assets) when mandating that publicly traded bank holding
companies have a risk committee. 4 1
As noted above, however, the Dodd-Frank Act shifts to a very different
measure when articulating bigness as a limitation as it does in section 171 of the
Act. In this instance, the underlying measure is the hard-to-determine and
never-used total risk-based liabilities for some but not all financial institutions,
and the limit is ten percent-unless the council determines after study that
138. SUMMARY OF DODD-FRANK, supra note 61, at 1.
139. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 115, 124 Stat. 1376, 1403 (2010).
140. Id. 5 163. Based on the FDIC data as of December 31, 2009, thirty-six banking institutions
had assets of $5o billion or more. See SDI, supra note 96.
141. Dodd-Frank Act 5 165(h)(2)(A).
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some other percentage is appropriate. 14 In no place in the Dodd-Frank Act is
there any explanation for the use of risk-based liabilities. One can easily
imagine that the idea is to estimate more accurately the potential exposure of
the government were an institution to fail. A more relevant measure might well
be the net market value of assets and liabilities. The main point here, however,
is that after many months of study, analysis, and debate, Congress could not
decide on a single measure of what is "big." That failure will haunt regulators
who, when next peering into the abyss, will be hard-pressed to determine what
is "too big."
CONCLUSION
Everybody agrees that systemic risk is a significant problem. But it has been
generally mischaracterized as a technical problem that requires a technical
solution. Implicitly, there is widespread acceptance of the view that if only we
had better regulations, or better regulators, the problem would disappear. In
fact, the problem is not only technical; it is structural and political. The
problem is not just with the structure of bank regulation; it is with the
structure of the political system. Politicians must intervene in times of banking
crisis, regardless of the costs and regardless of the consequences of such
intervention.
We have argued that acceptance of this political fact of life provides strong
support for our proposed solution to the problem of Too Big To Fail, which is
to break up the banks until they are sufficiently small that they no longer
present political risks to politicians and regulators. In our view, the way to
accomplish this goal is to dismantle the largest banks using a methodology that
specifies that no bank's liabilities can be permitted to grow to become greater
than five percent of the targeted value of the FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund for
the current year. This rule is simple and objective and can be implemented in a
straightforward way without providing regulators with too much discretion.
Most importantly, our proposed standard is insulated from political
influence; the benchmark that we propose is not subject to tinkering. The
FDIC must select a target value of not less than 1.15% of aggregate insured
deposits but no greater than 1.5o% of aggregate insured deposits.14 1 Our
standard has a very practical protection against tinkering because if regulators
or politicians increase the target value of the DIF in order to prevent one or
more banks from being dismantled, banks will have to pay the higher
142. Id. § 171.
143. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 7 (b)( 3 )(B), 12 U.S.C. § 181 7 (b)(3)(B) (20o6).
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assessments into the DIF that will be necessary in order to permit the FDIC
insurance fund to reach the new targeted size. We also should not lose sight of
the fact that the DIF is set at a level to self-insure against reasonably possible
losses. Setting the bright-line limit on financial institutions' size at five percent
of the target DIF is similarly designed to limit the risk that any one failure
could significantly impair the insurance fund or, for noninsured financial
institutions, present an unmanageable loss. The still-unresolved problems of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac well illustrate the problems of unregulated size.
As of the summer of 2010, Fannie and Freddie had received over $145 billion in
direct investment from the U.S. Treasury and, according to the Dodd-Frank
Act, represent a potential risk to the government of $5.3 trillion."
We observe that, if implemented, our plan would result in the breakup of
233 banks, which represent just three percent of the nation's banks. While this
may appear to be a radical restructuring, we emphasize that the cost of our
proposal is likely to be quite modest. Regardless of whether one selects
estimates of the transaction and efficiency costs associated with bailouts that
are on the high end of the scale or on the low end of the scale, these costs are
dwarfed by the massive costs of financial bailouts.
If voters took the time to compare the costs of our proposal with the
savings that would come with ending bank bailouts, our proposal would be
implemented swiftly. The structure of the U.S. banking industry would change
if the largest financial institutions were dismantled as we propose. But the
structure that emerged would not be entirely new. It would resemble the
traditional, highly disaggregated structure that characterized the financial
industry for most of the country's history. It may be the case that this structure
is somehow less efficient than our current structure. But it also is far more
stable. Most importantly, the disaggregated structure that we advocate would
shift the costs associated with banks' occasional forays into risky activities to
the investors who benefit from them.
144. Dodd-FrankAct, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1491(a)(9), 124 Stat. 1376, 22o6 (2010).
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